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For well over 150 years South Africa has been the center for an extensive system oflabor
migration in the southern African region. In the early 1800s, the migrant workers traveled
on foot from Mozambique, Malawi, and Lesotho to work in diamond mines. In the 1890s
migrants came from Swaziland, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Angola to work in
gold mines (Blanchfield, 1997). Foreign mine workers have traditionally made up at least
40% the labor force in South African mines (up to 80% in 1960s) and they provide a
major source of income for some neighboring states. According to the 1995 World Bank
Report (cited in Sechaba consultants, 1997), remittances from Basotho laborers working
in South Africa accounted for 50% ofLesotho's government's Gross National Product
(GNP) and equated 100% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the 1960s. Today
about 40% ofthe Basotho male labor force is employed in South Africa and remittances
account for a third of GNP (Sechaba consultants, 1997).
Since 1990 there has been a growing movement of foreign migrants and refugees to
South Africa. There are several reasons for this increased flow. One is the growing level
of economic disparity in the region. For some citizens of poor neighboring states, labor
migration to South Africa is the most promising means of overcoming economic
deprivation. This could be demonstrated by comparing the low level of migration to
South Africa from Botswana, a country which has per capita income levels comparable to
those of SouthAfrica, with that ofMozambique, where the per capita income is 35% less
than South Africa's (Human Rights Watch 1998). The second reason is the numerous
conflicts of social, economical and political nature in the continent. The growing number
of displaced people is a reflection of the instability and problems in home countries. Yet
another reason is the increasingly tighter regulations in the North to control the numbers
of immigrants. South Africa, on the other hand, despite its own particular social and
economic difficulties, is considered the largest, the most stable and vibrant economy of
the region. This coupled with the new constitution and the remarkable progress towards
establishing a free and democratic society, based on respect for human rights for all of its
citizens, makes it an attractive destination for those seeking better prospects for
individual freedoms, and collective security, social stability, and economic opportunities.
The ever-increasing number of migrants, however, has been accompanied by an alarming
increase in public's xenophobic feelings. They are constantly accused of taking jobs
away from South Africans, spreading all sorts of diseases from lice infections to AIDS,
and committing crimes, particularly drug related. The treatment of migration related
issues in the popular press have, unfortunately, been highly biased and uninformed. It has
perpetuated the erroneous stereotypical assumption about migrants and their impact on
South African society, while the real issues of concern such as prevalent exploitation of
foreign migrants and repeated violation of their human rights have been left unnoticed
and untreated.
The inflammatory statements of some politicians are widely reported and this fans the
flame of hatred and animosity towards foreign migrants. Minister ofRome Affairs,
Mangosuthu Buthelezi, for example, in his first introductory speech to parliament stated
that: "ifwe as South Africans are going to compete for scarce resources with millions of
aliens who are pouring into South Africa, then we can bid goodbye to our Reconstruction
and Development Program" (Buthelezi, 1994).
An important factor in the spread of panic and increased xenophobic sentiments is the
wild estimates of the number of migrants living/working in South Africa, particularly
those of the undocumented or illegal migrants. Inaccurate data gathering and record
keeping, as well as irresponsible and sensational reporting by journalists, has made the
task of estimating an accurate total number of migrants, particularly the undocumented
ones residing in South Africa, almost impossible. Before 1994, estimates of the numbers
ofundocumented aliens were below two million (the source ofthis number is unclear).
These numbers are more in line with those suggested by the South African Migration
Project (SAMP) which estimates between 0.5 to 1.5 million migrants (Crush, 1997a).
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However, in 1994-95, the Human Science Research Council (HSRC) published the
results of a survey that estimated the number of non-South Africans living in the country
to be 9.5 million. In their more recent report in 1997, HSRC raised their estimate to 12
million (Crush, 1997b).
The questionable results of these research projects along with other dubiously high
estimates have been widely used by the press and politician to raise alarm about the
impact of migrants. Everyone is too busy to blame the migrants, particularly the
undocumented cases, for all the ills of society to worry about their quality of life and the
gross violations of their human rights and abuses they suffer in the hands of officials as
well as the public.
1.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
The objective of this research is:
To prepare a profile of immigrants (both documented and undocumented) from
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRci who live in Durban metro area.
To investigate the social and economic situation in which these immigrants live.
To establish whether the conditions that resulted in their move conforms to those
suggested in the main international theories of migration.
To assess whether their expectations have been met.
To ascertain their views as to whether they would like to stay in South Africa
permanently or aim eventually to go back to their own country.
1 'Throughout the text of this dissertation the name Zaire has been interchangeably used for DRC the same
with the term Zairian for Congolese '
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1.3 OUTLINE OF DISSERTATION
In presenting the results of the study, this dissertation will begin with a brief overview of
the history of migration and the scope of the challenge it poses to the international
community. Chapter two then outlines the premises of the study and the methodology of
the research. Chapter three is devoted to tracing the general history of migration and the
theoretical framework that shapes the national as well as international policies with
regards to migration, immigration, asylum seeking and refugee reception and protection.
This chapter provides the conceptual framework from which the analysis of later chapters
can be drawn. Through a review of the relevant literature, the contemporary theories of
migration are examined and are placed in the context of the present realities of population
movement trends.
Chapter four attempts to place South African migration policies within a historical frame
and trace their development path. It also looks at the recent, post-apartheid history and
the attempts to upgrade and often revise the old policies. Chapter five examines the
historical events and social and economic conditions, which led to Congolese migration
from their native home to South Africa. In chapter six, the data gathered from the
interviews is organized in different sub chapters to examine everyday concerns of the
Zairian refugees such as the social and economic conditions and quality of their lives
once they reach South Africa; their reception by the general public and the officials of
their adopted country; and their contribution to the social and economic well being of
South Africa. This chapter also discusses the problem ofxenophobia and its role in the
lives of the refugees particularly its relationship to formation of informal social networks
that are instrumental in settlement and even survival of the refugees. In the last chapter
conclusions are drawn, alternatives for development of durable solutions are examined,




Since the early 1990s, many humanitarian and research organizations such as SAMP, the
Human Rights Watch, Institut francais d'Afrique du Sud (IFAS), School ofGovemment
at University ofWestern Cape, and others, have carried out quantitative research projects
dealing with different aspects of migration to South Africa. The purpose of the present
study was to add qualitative research and gather in-depth information about the lives and
times ofZairian immigrants in Durban. Although a small study, the qualitative approach
can help deepen the understanding about their reason for migrating and their
expectations. Ifpolicy is to be legitimate and effective, it needs to be based on an
understanding of the migration issues, as experienced by the migrants. Issues to be
considered include: why people move; why do they come to South Africa; whether they
plan to return to their home countries; how well are they doing in the economic setting of
their new home; what are they doing; and whether their activities have an impact on the
economy of South Africa.
Since the author had lived in Zaire for five years from 1987 to 1992, was able to speak
French and was involved with volunteer activities among th~ refugee community, the
prospect of researching the Zairian community in Durban was an interesting and logical
choice.
The research material for the study was gathered from five main sources:
• Review of literature about the general theories of population movements and
particularly about international migration
• Review of literature about the trends and issues in regional migration patterns and
particularly situations leading to large refugee influxes
• Extensive, in-depth interviews with ten Zairian refugees who have lived in Durban
for at least 3 years
• A focus group conducted with five Zairian refugees who have lived in Durban for less
than a year
5
• Substantive interviews with a representative of the Home Affairs department in
Pietermaritzburg, a Home Affairs Officer in the Refugee Reception Center in Durban,
and a representative of the Durban Refugee Forum.
A structured questionnaire combining a mix of open and close-ended questions was used
in the in-depth interviews (Appendix 1). The open-ended questions allowed the
interviewees to voice their own opinions and offer their interpretations about certain
aspects of their experiences in South Africa. These interviews sought to collect
information on the following broad issues: a) basic demographic information such as age,
sex, marital status and family size; b) participants' education level, and work and
business history in the country of origin; c) their migration history including the
motivation for their move to South Africa; d) the history of their arrival and settlement in
South Africa and more particularly in Durban including their interactions with the
officials and general public, any assistance they might have received from individuals or
organizations; and e) their current situation of employment, accommodation, satisfaction
with life, etc.
A total often individual interviews were arranged. These interviews were planned to be
with people who have been living in South Africa for a minimum of three years.
However, due to misunderstanding on the part of the informants, three interviews were
done with people who had been here for less than three years The length of stay of these
three in South Africa was 30,26 and 20 months, respectively. As there are no accurate
lists of refugees available (patrick Cowan, Pers. Corn.), on-probability sampling was used
in finding candidates for interviews. The main informant was a Zairian friend who was
also to play the role of interpreter if any of those who were to be interviewed might have
problem expressing themselves either in French or English. He arranged and
accompanied the interviewer for all the interviews. The presence of this informant who is
well liked and respected in the Zairian community, and his introduction of the interviewer
ensured easy access and rapid entry into the community.
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In finding participants a mix of snowball sampling and referral method was used. The
main informant was interviewed first, he then arranged the following two interviews.
Those interviewed then introduced the next two interviewees. However, when it became
obvious that all those interviewed up to that point were male and from the same province,
the main informant was asked to arrange interviews with people from other provinces and
at least with one Zairian woman. These were arranged and the seventh interviewee then
introduced the next informant, but he was not found and after three unsuccessful attempts
to locate that person, the main informant once again arranged another interview.
The last interview was purely coincidental. During the course of searching for the address
of ninth interviewee, a Zairian barber who works in the vicinity of the given address was
asked for directions. Upon hearing of the purpose of the visit he volunteered to be
interviewed. He then followed us to the house of the person with whom the interview was
arranged and was interviewed afterwards. The individual interviews took between two to
three hours each. Almost all of the interviews were conducted in the homes of the
interviewees or their friends except for one that took place at the interviewee's
barbershop, close to the market.
Because of the nature ofZairian culture, which is very social and collective, all of the
interviews were conducted in the presence of other people who were sometimes invited
by the interviewees to join them during the interview. This is perhaps because none of the
Zairian refugees have ever been interviewed before and they all had things they wanted to
say. Besides, almost none of those interviewed really lives alone and there are always
people around, be they a flat-mate, or a new comer who is staying with the family for a
while, or a "brother" visiting, Zairians are rarely alone. I learned the social nature of
Zairian culture when I was living in Zaire and discovered that even eating inside the
house was a signal of anti-social behavior that meant that one is not ready to share the
food with others. The only time spent inside the house was when one wanted to sleep. For
these cultural reasons it was almost impossible to have private and one to one interviews.
However, whenever possible, when the third party (ies) wanted to add or contradict the
statements of the interviewee, they were asked to tell their side after the statement from
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the interviewee was completed. What is noteworthy is that the statements were often
similar and although people have gone through their own particular journeys to get here,
the general experiences were quite similar. This similarity of experience, may be what
has brought them together as a network in the first place
This is a very important consideration whenever the snowballing method is used because
the possibility of biasing the sample is inherent in the method. For instance, the person
that introduces the next person to the researcher often chooses someone who has similar
experiences or often reflects similar opinions or values as himself. In this study, it
became clear towards the fifth interview that all those introduced were Zairians who have
come from the same tribe. They were all natives ofKasai province who lived outside
their own province, either in Shaba or in Kinshasa, and therefore subjected to tribal
persecution. Once this was noted the key informant was asked to find people from other
provinces or tribes. This is when the misunderstanding about the length of stay in South
Africa occurred. The main informant, a Kasaian himself, identified some people from
Kivu, another province in Eastern Zaire, to be interviewed. However, because he was not
as close to them as to the people ofhis own tribe, he may not have known exactly how
long they have been living in Durban.
Other indicators that snowballing leads to similar opinions or experiences from similar
types of people are:
• All those introduced for following interviews were men (except when the key
informant was particularly asked to introduce a woman).
• All those introduced for following interviews were highly educated (the key
informant was the only one who has not finished high school).
• All but the two youngest of those interviewed were people with successful careers
back in their own country.
• All but one of the interviewees were family men (although some ofthem are not
formally married but they had wives or girlfriends and children).
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Of those interviewed a majority of 6 out of 10 were married, 5 of them to Zairian women
and one to a lady from Burundi. Of the 4 single men, one lives with his children and his
long time Zairian girlfriend, one with his South African girlfriend and son, one has a Zulu
girl friend and a son but lives on his own and only one has no immediate family here.
All those interviewed in this research were men. This was noted with concern midway
through the research. When particular efforts were made to interview a Zairian woman, it
was arranged with a mother of 6 who was repeatedly called away. After 40 minutes she
was called away on an urgent business. Efforts were made to reschedule the interview but
she did not seem to be very keen and therefore it was abandoned. A further attempt to
visit another lady who lives in the neighborhood of one of the interviewees also failed.
The difficulty of encountering and interviewing Zairian women might be due to the
following:
• If the snowballing method is used, men tend to only think of other men as they see
women as dependents rather than decision makers
• Women tend to do lots of different kinds of work during the day such as shopping at
the market and doing what is necessary for the running of the household as well as
performing little side businesses
• Recently Zairian women have started doing car watch especially near the beach front
and some other areas of commercial activities and thus spend less time around the
house during the day
• Zairian women are generally more timid than the men and less educated. This results
in problems of communicating in either English or French. This might partially
explain their reticence to meet and talk to strangers.
A focus group was also conducted with the recently arrived Zairians, those who have
lived in Durban for less than a year. Twenty refugees were invited to participate but only
seven showed up. Two ofthese had lived in Durban for longer than two years. They were
asked not to participate in the discussion so that they would not influence the opinion of
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the newcomers. One of them volunteered to take notes of the discussions and the other
one (the main informant) played the role of translator when required.
Of the five participants of the focus group, 2 have been living here only for about 4
weeks, two for about 4 months and one about 10 months. Three of the participants were
from Kivu and two from Kasai province. The group interview was organized after all the
individual interviews had taken place. The purpose of the semi-structured, open-ended
questions of the focus group (Appendix 2) was to provide additional information about
the aspirations of the newly arrived refugees and the motive of their move as well as the
conditions of their lives and how far along have they come in settling into their new
situation and to compare their situation with those earlier arrivals. This especially in
regard to any encouragement they received for their move and/or any assistance they
might have received in settling into life in Durban from the informal network of their
compatriots.
The group interview was mainly conducted in French but one of the participants
preferred to express himself in Swahili and on occasion in his mother tongue, Mushi (a
local dialect). These comments were then translated into French for the interviewer.
The 2 hour and 40 minutes group interview was organized in the Durban Baha'! Centre.
It followed a luncheon, which was arranged as an icebreaker. This created a relaxed and
amicable atmosphere for the interview. Because the group was relatively small, there was
plenty of opportunity for everyone to voice their opinions. The questionnaire provided a
loose guide for the discussion and the order of some of the questions was changed as to
move naturally from one topic to the next. At the end of the session, all participants were
invited to share any ideas or concerns which might have been overlooked by the
interviewer.
The interview with Mr. Hurburun ofRefugee Reception Center in Durban was granted
after the questions (Appendix 3) were submitted to the head office in Pretoria. Interviews
with Mr. Cowan ofPietermaritzberg office however, were more informal and were
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arranged outside office hours and premises. The interview with the representative of the
Refugee Forum was arranged through the main informants and took place in the Forum's
office.
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CHAPTER THREE: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
3.1 HISTORY OF MIGRATION
The history of migration is as old as humanity itself The spread of human beings all over
the world from their original ecological origin in Sub-Saharan Africa is an ample testimony.
A careful study ofany era in human history reveals population mobility caused by a variety
offactors, yet almost always in search of some material improvement in their existing
conditions. For the purpose ofthe present study, migration flows are disaggregated
according to a widely accepted typology ofinternational migration, which identifies the
following groups:
• Permanent settlers (immigrants) including persons admitted under family reunion
schemes.
• Temporary contract workers, usually semi-skilled or unskilled workers who remain in
the receiving country for fmite periods, often 2 years.
• Temporary professional transients, professional or skilled workers who move from one
country to another usually as employees of international and/or joint venture companies.
• Clandestine or illegal workers whose entry may not be sanctioned by the receiving
country's government.
• Asylum seekers who cross borders and appeal for status on grounds of political
discrimination.
• Refugees as are defined by 1951 United Nation's (UN) Convention relating to the status
of refugees.
The modem history ofinternational migration can be divided roughly into 4 periods
(Massey et al, 1998: 1). The Mercantile Period, from 1500 to 1800, was dominated by flows
out ofEurope that stemmed from colonization plus economic growth undel mercantilist
capitalism. During this period emigration generally fell into 4 classes, a rflatively large
number ofagrarian settlers, a smaller number ofadministrators and artisans, an even smaller
number ofentrepreneurs who founded plantations to produce raw materials for Europe's
growing mercantilist economy. The most important source ofplantation laborwas the
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forced migrant African slaves. In over 3 centuries nearly 10 million African slaves were
imported into the Americas. And finally, in a very few cases, convict migrants were sent to
penal colonies overseas.
The second or Industrial Period ofemigration began early in the 19th century and stemmed
from the economic development ofEurope and spread of industrialism to former colonies in
the New World. From 1800 to 1925 over 48 million people left the industrialized countries
ofEurope in search of new lives in the Americas and Oceania. Ofthese emigrants, United
States alone received 60% and 25% went to four other destinations: Canada, Australia, New
Zealand and Argentina (Massey et aI, 1998:3).
During the third period, which was between the two World Wars, the large-scale European
emigration faltered. The outbreak ofthe First World War ushered a forty year long period of
limited migration. In addition, the onset ofthe great depression virtually stopped all the
international movements in 1929 and well into 1930s. And again in 1940s the Second World
War checked most of international Immigration movements. The mobility then was largely
ofrefugees and displaced persons and this continued well into the next decade.
Finally, by the beginning of 1960s, the Post-Industrial Period, Western Europe experienced
a booming economic recovery. Not only was unemployment virtually eliminated but also
large-scale inter-European migration was beginning to take place. On the other hand, the
Latin American countries were confronted with ever-growing number oftheir own nationals
entering the work force. These needed employment opportunities. As a result these countries
ceased to be the magnets drawing large numbers ofEuropean migrants.
Before 1925, 85% ofall international migration originated in Europe but since 1960s the
emigration from Africa, Asia and Latin America has increased dramatically. The variety of
destination covntries has also grown and countries throughout Western Europe now
attracted significant numbers of immigrants, especially Germany, France, Belgium,
Switzerland, Sweden and Netherlands. During the 1970s even long- time emigrant sending
nations such as Italy, Spain and Portugal began receiving immigrants (Massey et al, 1998:
13
2). After the rapid escalation ofoil prices in 1973, several less developed but capital-rich
countries in the Gulf region also began to sponsor massive labor migration. By 1980s,
international migration had spread into Asia including Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong,
Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand.
Compared to the earlier industrial era, contemporary patterns and processes of international
migration are far more complex. An assessment ofcontemporary migration has shown that
developing countries have been increasingly drawn into global networks. As many as 70
million persons, mostly from developing countries, are working, either legally or illegally, in
other countries. Over one million persons immigrate permanently to other countries each
year, close to an equal number seek asylum. In addition, 1998 witnessed almost 12 million
refugees and 5 million Internally Displaced Persons (lDPs) (UNHCR, 1999)..
3.2 CONTEMPORARY MIGRATION THEORIES
Understanding the causes ofglobal migration is ofparamount importance, for whatever
concepts and theories are drawn will determine predictions about the magnitude, duration,
and character of international migration in the new century and, hence, the policies that will
ultimately be adopted to meet this unique global challenge. The theoretical concepts
presently employed by social scientists for analyzing and explaining international migration
were primarily formed during the industrial era and reflect its particular economic
arrangements, social institutions, technology, demography and politics. Although fluid and
creative when first derived, they have grown rigid over time and now appear ill suited to the
dramatically different conditions ofthe new millennium. With the passage oftime (Massey
et al1998: 3) the reality of international migration has changed but the theoretical
framework shaping the policies has remained firmly anchored in the past. We are now well
into a post-industrial, post-cold war in a new century within which immigration will play a
central role. Our understanding ofthe problems then should reflect the changes in patterns,
trends and causes ofpopulation movements across the globe.
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Because the prevailing theoretical approach to international migratory dynamics does not
adequately come to terms with the complexities of the current realities, social scientists have
begun to question the two pillars upon which earlier models were built. At the micro level,
they question the conceptualization ofmigration as rational response to economic disparities
between countries. At the macro level, they question the push-pull approach, which views
migration as a means ofestablishing equilibrium between supply and demand oflabor in
different regions (Castle and Miller, 1993). It is time then to reassess the current theories of
international migration and formulate new ones. Among the theories dominating migration
studies the following have been the most influential.
3.2.1 THE NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMIC THEORY
In traditional economic frameworks, it is assumed that migrants move because they
expect to benefit from a net gain in income as a direct result of their move. The larger the
expected income gain, the more likely it is for the people to move. Increase in wages in
destination areas should, therefore, increase the volume of migration while its decrease
should lower it. For example, Louis 1. Ernmerij quotes figures showing that average annual
per capita income oflow-income countries increased from $140 in 1965 to $270 by the
beginning ofthe 1980s whereas the increase in industrial countries was from $8,800 to
$14,400. Furthermore, by the late 1980s per capita income in developing countries had
slipped back to the end of 1970s level "thus regressing each year over the last decade"
(Ernmerij, 1991 :6). This by itself should provide the strongest motive for an unprecedented
Northwards exodus from all the low-income countries ofthe South. This vision, however,
has little resemblance to the reality of migration. In the past twenty years, for example,
average wages have steadily declined in real terms in US while immigration has steadily
increased (Massey et aI, 1998: 8). The reasonable prediction, based on the observed
patterns, would be that even if wages in the main receiving countries were to decline
moderately, it will not have a marked effect on the volume of international migration
flowing to them. This is because, no matter how wages are measured (real, nominal or
expected) or how much they fluctuate, wage differences between North and South has/~
been and will remain large enough to draw substantial northward movement from nearly
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all the less-developed countries. Yet, most of these lower income countries are not major
players in international migration today. Take the case ofEurope, for instance. Although
there is a substantial wage difference between Northern and Southern Europe, for
example, little migration occurs between Spain, Portugal and Italy to Germany, Belgium
and Denmark. As Massey and his colleagues concluded:
"Classical economic perspective has led analysts to focus exclusively on
economic disparities between areas of origin and destination, which are
evaluated by rational actors seeking to maximize utility. At times
researchers have seemingly found it sufficient simply to enumerate the
economic and demographic disparities separating two regions, and then
deduced an all but inevitable future flow of migrants between them"
(Massey et aI, 1998: 9).
Yet rarely do analysts stop and ask why predicted flows have not materialized before,
given the longstanding nature of those economic differences. Also,
"[a]ccording to neoclassical economic theory, the departure of migrants
raises wages in sending areas and lowers them in receiving areas. Migration
should thus continue until wages are equalized and then it should stop.
Historical experience reveals, however, that transitional wage differentials
rarely disappear, and when they do it is through a variety of factors among
which international migration is not necessarily the most important.
Migration typically has not ended with the equalization of wages, but with
attainment of bearable conditions of life in the areas of origin, after which
people find migration not worth the effort. For example, despite the absence
of legal barriers to movement and the persistence of a significant wage
difference, sustained net migration between Puerto Rico and USA effectively
ended in the early 1970s as did migration between Spain and Germany"
(Massey et aI, 1998: 9).
Although it is clear that generally little movement occurs in the absence ofjob opportunities
and/or wage differentials, these alone are not enough to explain international movement.
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For international migration to occur, the economic conditions in the country oforigin must
be perceived not simply as inferior to that ofthe country of destination but rather as
unsupportive. Often there are other material and psychological factors which may
predominate over expected gains in explaining the propensity to move (Massey and Espana,
1987:733). Ifthis is true then more weight should be given to non-pecuniary factors such as
concerns about safety, security, hopes, aspirations and expectations about the future, etc,
which are by nature subjective and vary for each individual.
3.2.2 PUSH AND PULL THEORY
This has been an inseparable companion of the traditional economic approach to
migration. The basic concept of this framework is that in every area there are many
factors which act to hold people within that area or attract others to it, and there are other
factors that tend to repel them from it (Lee cited in Yaukey, 1978: 277). Besides the pull
and push factors, there are also a set of intervening obstacles between the two areas
which can be viewed as the "costs" involved in moving from the point of origin to that of
destination (Lee cited in Yaukey, 1978: 278).
Most of the influential factors on either side of the spectrum, although never explicitly
stated, have been assumed to be economic and able to affect most people in much the
same way. Recent trends, however, indicate that there are other important factors such as
social, cultural, political and environmental that affect different people, and do so not
uniformly.
• Economic Factors
The push-pull framework assumes that migration enables the forces of economic growth
in different geographic regions to achieve equilibrium (Massey et aI, 1998: 15). For
example, excess supply of labor in one area (push) and higher wages due to scarcity of
labor in another area (pull) causes the migration of large number of workers from the
former to the latter. This will continue till a time when the entrance of migrant workers
sufficiently supplements the existing labor force thus reducing the wages in the receiving
country. From then on the pull factor loses some of its power. In the country of origin,
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large number of excess labor is gone enabling the labor market to achieve a closer
balance between supply and demand of its labor. As the result of diminished pool of
extra workers, the wages go up and therefore some of the push factors, such as low
wages, lose some oftheir power. These two opposite groups of factors combine to create
equilibrium in labor markets and wages in both countries.
This might have explained certain trends in the industrial era where restrictive admission
policies were virtually absent, however, the conditions and policies of the receiving
countries have dramatically changed. The imposition of quantitative as well as qualitative
or selective limits on entries creates different classes of migrants and changes the
previous balances of pull and push factors. The more restrictive the policies become the
higher are the costs of migration for different categories of migrants and their risk of
failure (Massey et aI, 1998: 15). In other words, contemporary migration is shaped less
by economic pull and push factors, which dominated economic theories of migration,
than by the receiving countries' policies of quotas and composition of those allowed in.
• Demographic Factors
Until now we have focused primarily on economic disparity between countries but
demographic forces within nations also aggravate the migration process. Economic
transformation is usually accompanied by demographic shifts that change the rate of
population growth, and cause the numbers of potential job seekers, consumers and
service users to swell or diminish. In practice, as well as in theory, contemporary wisdom
dictates that demographic factors, under certain conditions, play an essential role in
promoting international migration (Straubhaar, 1993). But no matter how influential these
factors may be, "demographic pressures" in the sending region does not translates
directly into migration towards areas of lower pressure. In other words, the relevant
issues are demographic trends and not demographic disparities:
" High fertility and rapid population growth produce large birth cohorts that
have migration-promoting effects within specific social and economic
contexts: they put pressure on social infrastructure such as schools roads, ,
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hospitals, clinics; they make satisfaction of consumer desires more difficult;
they make it harder to provide decent and affordable housing; they raise
unemployment rates and generally they channel state resources away from
productive investment into current consumption, drive up public expenditure
and contribute to state deficit and foreign debt. The latter outcomes may
further exacerbate migratory pressure by leading public officials to adopt
policies of structural adjustment that, in the short run, aggravate
unemployment, consumer scarcity, and housing shortages to yield social
tensions, impelling people to search for relief through international
migration" (Massey et aI, 1998: 11).
Demographic trends in the countries ofthe South have placed enormous strains on their
governments' capacity to provide education, social security and especially jobs. A typically
weak resource base, low productivity, high external debt and difficulty of access to world
markets have combined with massive unemployment to stabilize or even depress low rates
ofeconomic growth in many ofthese countries (Massey et al, 1998: 13). Indeed,
demographic differentials between South and North are as striking in their scope and
magnitude as are the economic differentials.
The integration ofdemographic factors into a broader theory of international migration,
however, is a goal that remains to be fully accomplished. One of the main attempts in that
direction was made by Zelinsky (1971) in which he considered demographic as well as
historical and geographic factors. One ofthe factors which was considered central to his
theory, namely the physical distance, however, has certainly changed profoundly in
character and importance in the past three decades (Zelinsky, 1971). Although, proximity to
a receiving area continues to be an important consideration, it is no longer as decisive a
factor as it once was. Its importance has diminished greatly as improvement in
transportation and communication have allowed human beings to overcome the barriers of
space and information in less time, with greater ease, and at lower cost than ever before.
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There is no doubt that modem communications have made people in the South better
informed about lifestyle and opportunities in the North, and modem travel has made it easier
for them to go there. Globalization ofeconomic networks and formation ofregional
economic blocks have also brought migration, internal as well as regional and international,
within the reach ofmany people in the South.
3.2.3 THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL CAPITAL
The concept of social capital was introduced by the economist Glenn Loury (1977) who
used it in order to designate "a set of intangible resources in families and companies that
helped to promote social development among young people" (Massey et aI, 1998: 42).
Later on Bourdieu (1986) pointed out that social capital had broader relevance to human
society. According to Bordieu and Warquant (1992: 119),
"[s]ocial capital is the sum ofthe resources actual or virtual that accrue to an
individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or
less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition."
The most important characteristic of social capital is asserted to be its convertibility. It
could be converted to other forms ofcapital, notably financial capital. People gain access to
social capital through membership in networks and social institutions and then convert it
into the other forms ofcapital to improve or maintain their position in society (Bordieu,
1986: 23).
Migrant networks are sets of interpersonal ties that through bonds ofkinship, friendship and
shared community origin connect migrants, former migrants and non-migrants in origin and
destination areas. These networks increase the likelihood of international movement
because, on the one hand, they lower the costs and risks of movement and on the other, they
increase the expected net return from migration. Network connections constitute a form of
social capital that people draw upon to gain access to various kinds ofresources such as:
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financial capital, foreign employment, high wages, and the possibility ofaccu
mulating
savings and sending remittances (Massey et al, 1998:43).
Sociologists began to recognize the importance ofnetworks in promoting inte
rnational
movement in the 1920s. Not-yet migrants draw on social ties offriends and fa
mily members
who migrated before to gain access to knowledge, assistance and other resour
ces that
facilitated their migratory move. Levy and Wadycki (1973) called these network
s 'family
and friend effect". MacDonald and MacDonald (1974) defined them as "migr
ant chains"
and Taylor (1986,1987) labeled them as a form of "migrant capital". Massey
et al (1987:
70), however, appear to have been the first to identify migrant networks specif
ically as a
form of"social capital" (Massey et al, 1998:43).
After Coleman's assertion (1990:304) that "social capital ... is created when
the relations
among persons change in a way that facilitate action", Massey and his colleag
ues followed
with looking at migration itself as the catalyst for the change in the nature of s
ocial relations.
"Everyday ties of friendship and kinship provide few advantages, in and of
themselves, to people seeking to migrate abroad. Once someone in a
personal network has migrated, however, the ties are transformed into a
resource that can be used to gain access to foreign employment and all its
benefits. Each act of migration creates social capital among people, to
whom the new migrant is related, thereby raising the odds of their
migration" (Massey et aI, 1987, 1994 cited in Massey et all, 1998: 43).
The first migrants who leave their country oforigin for a new destination have
no
connections or social ties in the destination area to draw upon. For them migra
tion is costly
particularly if it involves entering another country without documents, or fixed
jobs. The
presence ofthese first migrants in the destination areas, however, reduces the
potential costs
of migration substantially for friends and relatives left behind. Because ofthe
nature of
kinship and friendship structures and their underlying ties, each potential migr
ant creates his
own set of social ties to the destination area. Migrants are also inevitably link
ed to non-
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migrant in the country ofdestination and they later draw upon obligations implicit in
relationships such as kinship and/or friendship to gain access to employment and assistance
at the point of destination (Massey et aI, 1998: 15).
Extensive and well-established networks make international migration extremely attractive.
When they are well developed they put a job at destination country within easy reach of
most community members and make emigration a reliable and secure source of income.
They become an established coping mechanism for the family and/or community. Every
new migrant expands the network and decreases the risks of movement for all those to
whom he/she is related and might want to follow him, eventually making it virtually risk
free and costless.
Once international migration flows in certain directions have started, private institutions
or voluntary organizations tend to rise to fill in the gap which exists between the ever
increasing numbers of in-corners and the limited number ofjobs, visas and opportunities
available. The restrictions, barriers and imbalances create a lucrative black market for
some individuals or institutions to bring in the migrants. As this black market creates
conditions ofexploitation and victimization, a variety of voluntary humanitarian
institutions also arise to safeguard the treatment and rights of both legal and
undocumented migrants (Massey et aI1998:44). These institutions which are formed as a
result of the migration flow and are part of its soCial networks are in turn influential in
shaping that flow itself Therefore, although economic factors such as wage differentials,
employment opportunity, low costs of relative risks, etc, may continue to influence the
people to move, new conditions that arise in the course of migration come to function as
independent causes themselves. Spread of migration networks, development of
institutions that support transnational movement, and changes in the social meaning of
work, all assist in making additional movements more likely, leading to the perpetuation
of international migration across time and space (Massey et aI, 1998: 44).
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3.2.4 DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION THEORY
The complex pattern ofmigration in the rapidly developing regions can be partly explained
by the application ofa model based on the concept ofdemographic transition. Transition
occurs over three stages of modernization or industrialization represented by the horizontal
axis from high birth and high death rates in first stage to low birth and low death rates in the
fourth stage.
The silent feature ofthe regular or legal immigration is that receiving country's government
decides on the numbers and composition ofthose that are to be accepted. Millions may
wish to immigrate to a more prosperous country but achieved flows will comprise only of
those persons who receiving governments are prepared to accept. A migrant's acceptability
will depend largely upon hislher ability or likelihood to contribute to the receiving country's
social and economic development. The receiving country's specific requirements will,
therefore, depend upon its stage ofeconomic development or modernization (Appleyard,
1991:22).
• First stage oftransition: A country at the first stage oftransition would be unlikely to
need and therefore unlikely to attract permanent settlers or temporary contract and
illegal workers. If its ample supply of low cost labor attract foreign investment, then the
industries which are being built, or the resources being exploited, would almost certainly
need the services and advice ofprofessional transients. On the other hand emigration is
likely to be high at early stages oftransition but declines as a country approaches final
stages of transition (Appleyard, 1991: 23). Although refugees and asylum seekers would
probably not want to enter a country in its early stages oftransition, this would depend
to a large extent, upon political circumstances in their homelands.
Zolberg's case studies show that patterns ofconflict, which leads to refugee situation,
are intimately related to more general economic and political considerations (Zolberg,
1986). Refugees are therefore likely to move from countries at early stages oftransition
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to countries at similar stages and even experience economic conditions inferior to those
in the countries that they left behind.
• Middle stages oftransition: At this stage oftransition, when birth rates have declined
only slightly but death rates markedly, population growth is high. If a country moves
rapidly through transition, experiencing high rates ofeconomic growth (modernization)
as have Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan, labor supply may soon have to be
supplemented by foreign contracts, and even illegal workers. Professional transients
would also arrive in increasing numbers (Appleyard, 1991 :24).
With modernization, incentive for permanent migration recedes, as does contract/illegal
worker emigration because oflocal job creation. Ifthe country's education and training
system have improved, there may also be some loss ofpersons who join the ranks of
professional transients. There is, however, less likelihood ofemigration occurring
where there is limited political freedom or human rights (Appleyard, 1991: 25).
• At fmal stage oftransition, a country is not only likely to require a sustained supply of
workers, because sub replacement fertility has decreased its own supply, but also offers
permanent residence to highly skilled and professional migrants and their dependents.
Migrants could even include former citizens who left the country during an earlier stage
oftransition as part ofbrain drain. A country at the final stage oftransition would also
be more likely to extend permanent settlement rights to refugees and to attract asylum
seekers including those whose appeals were based mainly upon economic depravation in
their homeland (Appleyard, 1991: 27).
These models or theories might explain some aspects ofa deliberate, well thought ofand
well orchestrated wave of labor migration in the rapidly industrializing countries such as the
''East Asian Tigers". They are unable however, to shed much light on the plight ofrefugees,
particularly those in Asia and Africa, who often flee to areas in similar stage oftransition if
not one stage behind their own countries. The situation ofthe Zairian refugees in South
Africa provides an interesting study of some ofthe complexities ofthe current international
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migration. On the one hand, they have left their countries fearing for their liv
es rather than
intending to seek alternative habitation for maximizing economic opportuniti
es. They have,
in large numbers, escaped often with nothing but their own, and their family'
s, lives. No
time to apply for, collect or gather even the most important documents such a
s passports or
even certificates oftermination of study, etc. Upon arrival at a neighboring c
ountry such as
Zambia, Angola, Tanzania or Malawi, they have applied for protection and s
upport ofthe
international agencies. Everyone seems to recognize their plight and dire nee
d for asylum.
However, due to the overwhelming numbers ofthe refugees and the very lim
ited ability of
these countries, even with the assistance received from the international com
munity to
handle them, they are pushed further and further into their roles ofthe needy.
The refugees, particularly the young ones or those with children, have realize
d the
magnitude of the situation that has led them to flee their native homes and be
cause they do
not see any immediate relief in sight they have to look for longer-term solutio
ns. Thus, the
search for more viable alternative begins. They move from one camp to anoth
er and often
from one country to the next in search of more reasonable access to security a
nd
opportunity. At this stage, as far as the international laws are concerned, they
cease to be
refugees because they have left the country oftheir first refuge behind. They
are no longer
victims in need ofprotection but opportunists seeking economic advantages.
The ironic fact is that a Zairian who decides from the beginning that South A
frica is a more
attractive destination, politically, financially, socially, etc, and thus makes arr
angements to
arrive in this country directly from his native land, will easily obtain the cove
ted asylum
seekers permit without much difficulty. Yet another one, who has been forced
to leave
without much planning or preparation and has been pushed by circumstances
beyond his/her
control from country to country and has ended up in South Africa, not as a pa
rt ofa grand
plan but as a natural consequence ofthe events, although he/she is recognized
as an asylum
seeker, will not receive such a status but a temporary permit for the prohibite
d person. He is
thus labeled because South Africa is not hislher country ofthe first refuge. Th
e question is
who decides who is a genuine refugee and who is an economic refugee, unde
r what
conditions these are distinguished and how? What happens to the push-pull th
eory ifthe
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dominating forces in the migration are disproportionately push factors? And
in the light of
regional policies of instability and conflict who is responsible for the plight o
f victims?
In the next chapter we will examine the development ofthe immigration polici
es in South
Africa as one of the receiving countries, how these policies affect the treatme
nt of
immigrants particularly the refugees and whether they are in line with the internatio
nal
conventions and protocols and the new South African constitution.
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CHAPTER FOUR: DEVELOPMENT OF MIGRATION LAWS IN SOUT
H
AFRICA
4.1 History of South African Immigration Policy
The history of migration to South Africa starts with the establishment of the D
utch
settlements in the 1650s. These settlements were used as halfway stations for
trade to the
east. The Dutch were followed by the British who took over and colonized th
e region.
The British dominance ofthe area lasted through the beginning of the twentie
th Century.
The ftrst Indians came to Natal in 1850 as indentured laborers. By 1911 the In
dian
population had grown to over 152,000 (peberdy and Crush, 1998: 22). On com
pletion of
indenture most of these decided to stay in South Africa as "free" Indians. The
y, in turn,
attracted other Indian immigrants mainly Muslim traders and family members
. This rapid
expansion of Indian population alarmed the racist white government and whit
e
businessmen who saw the Indian traders as a serious threat. This led to the in
troduction of
the Immigration Regulation Act in 1913, three years after the formation ofUn
ion of
South Africa in 1910. Before then each of the provinces had its own immigra
tion
legislation. Introducing the act in parliament the minister said: "everyone kne
w it was
the intention of South Africa to exclude Asiatics". He also indicated that Indi
ans and all
the other no.n-whites immigrants were "unsuitable" to the requirements of the
Union and
therefore "prohibited immigrants" (as quoted in Peberdy and Crush, 1998: 22
)
The primary provisions of this legislation were: the establishment of a Depart
ment of
Immigration; criteria for entry; an immigration board ofappeal; an appeal pro
cess against
the prohibition; power of detention of the prohibited persons by the police an
d the
immigration officers; and an exemption to the act that gave the minister discr
etion to
allow the entry of certain groups of people who would otherwise be considere
d as
prohibited persons. (For details about the role of each ofthese provisions see
appendix 4)
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The restrictions imposed on movement ofblack South Africans by the previo
us
provincial laws were incorporated into 1913 acts which defined them not as f
ull citizens
with rights to free movement but as "non-citizens", as "aliens" subject to the
same
regulations that governed the entry of non- South Africans.
The 1913 Immigration Regulation Act was amended repeatedly before and af
ter the
Second World War. Most of these amendments resulted in increasing restrict
ions on
black Africans and particularly the migrant workers ability to immigrate to th
e country
and extended the powers of the immigration officers.
All throughout the apartheid time immigration by definition was the regulatio
n through
policy of the entry ofwhite people, who were categorized into suitable or des
irable
(people from England and other Western European countries) and undesirable
(people
such as Jews, Russians, Poles or citizens of other Eastern European countries)
. Africans
were never considered as immigrant but only as migrant laborers allowed for
finite
periods of stay in the country until such time as their labor was no longer nee
ded and they
had to return home.
In 1984, The Aliens and Immigration Laws Amendment Act went further and
classified
all the inhabitants of the "independent" homelands as "aliens". Further amend
ment in
1986, however, removed the definition of"European" from Section 4 of the A
ct that
required all immigrants to be "assimilable" in the European population. This
meant that
for the first time black people could officially immigrate to South Africa. Thi
s ofcourse
was not as a result of moral enlightenment but rather to allow the homelands
to benefit
from a growing brain drain of black skills from the rest ofAfrica (peberdy an
d Crush,
1998: 31).
The only major piece of immigration legislation introduced by the apartheid r
egime was
the 1991 Aliens Control Act (ACA) (peberdy and Crush, 1998: 33). It consolida
ted the
numerous acts inherited from the apartheid and pre-apartheid era that extende
d the
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absolute power of the state, and was to entrench the politics of the past and set the
perimeters within which reforms would take place.
The stated purpose of the ACA was to "provide for the control of the admission of
persons to, their residence in and their departure from the Republic" (preamble to the
act). It was not drafted with asylum seekers in mind and no mention is made in it of terms
such as refugee or asylum. Instead asylum seekers and refugees are dealt with as a class
ofthe old dreaded "prohibited person". The Act empowers an immigrant official to make
a declaration to the effect that an individual is a prohibited person (section 9, 10 and 39).
The ACA act and its amendment provide a long list ofgrounds for a person to be
declared prohibited such as:
• Persons likely to become a public charge including: those undesirable for political
reasons; a prostitute or anyone living off the earning of one; anyone with a criminal
record; any mentally or physically disabled person without security for permanent
support; and/or anyone carrying a contagious or "loathsome" disease.
• Persons deemed to be undesirable by the minister from information received through
diplomatic or official channels
• Persons who have been removed from the Republic under warrant
• Persons who have been removed from the Republic in terms of the act
To be able to treat the cases of the refugees and the asylum seekers in the prohibited
person category the following grounds were added to the above list of prohibited persons.
These include failure to: enter the country at a port of entry; contact immediately with an
immigration officer; produce a passport; support oneself resulting in becoming a public
charge; satisfy the officer that one is not a prohibited person; and/or comply with
numerous other conditions imposed by the Act.
In addition to these categories, anyone who satisfies the standing committee that he/she
qualifies as a refugee, in terms of the established conventions, but South Africa is not
his/her country of first asylum is also dealt with under the prohibited person category.
This means that they have lived for a period of more than three months in country (s)
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through which they have travelled in order to reach South Africa and either have applied
for asylum there or have failed to apply for asylum there.
Added to this list is anyone who the minister considers to be undesirable inhabitant or
visitor. There are no provisions in the act for the reasons to be given for such a
declaration. While there has been human rights oriented interpretation ofvarious
provisions ofthis act by courts since 1994, South Africa's current immigration policy is
still deeply rooted in the country's racial and political history. The 1913 Immigration
Regulation Act and 1937 Aliens Act which stipulate who, how many and on what
grounds could be allowed to enter the country, are explicitly racist and discriminatory.
They remain essentially unchanged even after amendments in 1972 and 1991.
The 1995 Amendment Act removed some of the more flagrant violations of the rights of
the undocumented immigrants, but despite these changes, it still remained questionable in
terms of its legitimacy in a democratic and non-racial state.
The debates over the green paper on International Migration resulted in suggestions for
two pieces of new legislation to replace the inherited ACA. The first was a refugee bill
''to give effect to ... right-oriented temporary protection system" (Crush, 1998: 14), and
the second, a new immigration act to "govern the entry and exit of both immigrants and
migrants in the country" (Crush, 1998: 14). Both pieces oflegislation were passed by the
parliament in 1998, and the new refugee act will come to effect from April 2000.
4.2 INTERNATIONAL LAWS PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF MIGRANTS: '¥-
The Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), together known as the "International Bill ofHuman Rights"
form the foundation of international human right laws. These laws confer the great
majority of rights they enumerate to "everyone". It enjoins all states to respect and ensure
that the rights they set out are applied to all the individuals within their territory without
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discrimination. The rights that are conferred on all migrant workers (documented as well
as undocumented) include:
• Migrants and their families shall enjoy treatment not less favorable than that which
applies to nationals in respect to remuneration and conditions of work
• Migrants and their families shall be entitled to emergency medical treatment
• The children of migrant workers have the right to a name, registration ofbirth, a
nationality and access to education on the basis of equality of treatment with nationals
of the state concerned (Convention on the Protection of the Rights ofAll Migrant
Workers, articles 25, 29, 30).
Documented migrant workers have certain additional rights including equality of
treatment with nationals in respect to access to educational institutions; housing; social
services; health services; and the rights to repatriate their earnings (Convention on the
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers, articles 43,45,47).
The UN Convention relating to the Status ofRefugees (1951) and the Organization of
African Unity (OAD) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects ofRefugee Problems
in Africa (1969) provide definitions of the term "refugee" and set out principal rights of
refugees in the host country, which in a number of aspects are explicitly stated to be the)
same as those of nationals in the country (Human Rights Watch, 1998). These include:
access to courts (including access to legal assistance); labor protection; public assistance;
elementary education; and the same rights as migrants in respect to seeking gainful ~
employment, access to housing or higher education.
4.3 SOUTH AFRICA'S CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS
)
South Africa's constitution does not make a distinction between citizens and non-citizens"""" ~
I
for the most of the rights indicated in its Bill ofRights. The only rights reserved for South
African citizens are the right to enter the country, to obtain a passport, to vote, to stand
for office, to form a political party and other political rights (Constitution of the Republic
of South Africa, (1996), Section 19-21).
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)
The South African constitution reiterates and protects most of internationally recognized
human rights, and places upon the state an obligation to "respect, protect, promote and
fulfil the rights in the Bill ofRights" (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, J
(1996), Section 7). An area of the Bill ofRights that has a great impact on the rights of
migrants in South Africa is its enumeration of social and economic rights, which also
apply to all persons, not just citizens. These include the right to: safe environment;
adequate housing; health care; sufficient food and water; social security and education;
and to one's own language and participation in cultural life of one's own choice
(Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, Section 19-21).
The best-documented areas of migration in South Africa are the movement of temporary
workers from the surrounding African countries into such sectors as mining and
agriculture (Rogerson, 1997) Some recent research has been done in the less known
position of immigrants who have established themselves in Small and Medium and
Macro Enterprises (SMMEs) and the informal sectors and their contribution to the
economy ofthe country (Rogerson, 1997; McDonald, 1998). The area least studied is the
lives of immigrants and their quality of life (McDonald, Mashike and Golden, 1999),
particularly of those who come not from the immediate neighboring countries but from
further distances. What aspirations bring them so far from home? What expectations did I
they have about their chosen destination? How and from where did they gather their
./
information about South Africa? Have their expectations been met?
4.4 SOUTH AFRICA JOINS REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE
PROTOCOLS
South Africa began moving out of its international isolation in 1991 as the negotiation for
1994's democratic election began. In the same year the South African government signed
an agreement with UNHCR indicating willingness to co-operate with that organization in
the repatriation of exiles from apartheid to South Africa.
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In 1993 the government signed another agreement to establish an office of the High
Commissioner and granted certain diplomatic privileges to that office. The agreement
included establishing procedures for determining refugee status and granting asylum to
certain refugees.
In October 1994, South Africa became the 53rd member of the Organization for African
Unity (OAD) and on December 1995 signed the 1969 OAU Convention governing the
specific aspects of refugee protection in Africa. In January 1996, South African
government signed the 1951 United Nations' Convention relating to the status of refugees
and its 1967 protocol.
4.5 mSTORY OF REFUGEES IN SOUTH AFRICA
The movement of refugees to South Africa is not new. From colonization in 1652
onward, the area south of the Limpopo River has been the settlement of people who left
their homes further north in Africa, Europe, and Asia due to religious and political
persecution, war, famine and economic hardship. More recently, during 1970s and 1980s,
when Portuguese colonial rule in Angola and Mozambique ended, South Africa granted
asylum to many people ofPortuguese descent fleeing from those countries on their way
back to their own. It also granted the rights of citizenship and permanent residence in the
country to those who wished to remain in South Africa. These privileges, however, were
reserved for the whites alone. The civil war in Mozambique, for example, brought
thousands of black Mozambicans to the country not as refugees but as illegal aliens who
were sent back immediately upon being discovered. These were of course in addition to
those who were legal migrant workers. In October 1985 the Department ofHome Affairs
estimated the number ofMozambicans living in South Africa to be 63,000. Later that
year the minister ofHome Affairs, Stofell Botha said that his department was repatriating
1,500 people a month (de la Hunt 1998: 123).
In 1993, as the repatriation ofMozambican refugees was beginning, the UNHCR
estimated the numbers to be around 300,000, other agencies put the figure at half a
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million (de la Hunt, 1998: 125). In order to enter South Africa, all these people had to
negotiate a 63 km electrified border fence (when the voltage was reduced, between 1986
to 1990, the fence carried 3,300 volts). They were regarded as illegal migrants, had no
protection and were liable to summary deportation (de la Hunt, 1998: 125).
The introduction of asylum procedures and the peaceful outcome of the 1994 election
saw an influx of asylum seekers other than the immediate neighbors. These include
asylum seekers from African countries such as Angola, Somalia, DRC, Ethiopia,
Rwanda, Kenya, Burundi, Senegal, Ghana, Nigeria and Liberia, as well as those from
other continents particularly from Asia. These include refugees from India, Pakistan,
China and Bangladesh.
Current statistics of the number of refugees in South Africa are confusing and widely
inconsistent, particularly with regard to the number of illegal immigrants. Figures as high
as 8 million have been given. The only "remotely reasonable figures" are those ofHome
Affairs that indicate approximately 750,000 people who entered the country on various
temporary visas or permits have not left the country again through a border post (Duncan
1998: 150).
Table 1: Number of asylum seekers
Date No. of asylum No. of cases No, of cases No. of
applications approved rejected unfounded cases
May 95 3,664 383 512
June 96 16,967 1,915 3,704 1945
Aug. 97 32,510 4,002 7,725 1393
Dec. 99* 59,426* 42,101 * - -
Source: de la Hunt 1998, P. 127
Source*: UNHCR, 31 December 1999 (Appendix 5)
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These statistics do not reflect all the people who have entered South Africa legally on
work or study permit or illegally and would be entitled to apply for the refugee status.
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONGOLESE MIGRATION TO SOUTH AFRICA
5.1 FACTORS LEADING TO MIGRATION OF ZAIRIANS TO SOUTH
AFRICA
As we have previously examined, most of the current international theories of migration
concentrate on the economic factors as the most influential proponents of the decision of
majority of people that make their move from the country of origin to an alternative
destination. These theories assume that the conditions in the latter are much more
lucrative than those ofthe former. These economic differentials then assume a powerful
pull that attracts the multitudes to the better off countries. The international experiences
of the last decades and the movement of the refugees around the globe, however, seem to
paint a different picture.
Rather than concluding a propensity for the masses to move for economic improvement, one
might even posit the opposite; that persons suffering severe poverty are generally more
likely to stay put until near starvation or other catastrophic conditions overtake them and
then they try to move elsewhere, probably as is the case in Africa, to a nearby country which
is not much better offthan their own. Distance, inability to finance travel and fear of
unknown combine to prevent people (specially the poor) from becoming part ofa mass
exodus, so feared by the more developed countries (Appleyard, 1991: 6).
In examining the situation ofthe Congolese refugees in South Africa, it becomes clear that
the main factors influencing their decision to move from their native country was not the
hope ofeconomic gain nor any other attractive pull factor. Often, the move was clearly the
only way out ofa very unstable and terrifying political, tribal, economic, and social chaos.
Eight out of 10 ofthe interviewees left their homes because ofa direct threat of massacre. A
briefglimpse at most recent social and economic situation ofZaire will illustrate this point.
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5.2 A BRIEF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROFfi.,E OF DRC
The last national census in Zaire was conducted in 1985. The total population was 34.7
million with average population density just above 15 inhabitants per sq. km. The most
populated provinces included Kivu with 5.2, Haut Zaire with 4.2, Shaba with 3.9 and
Kinshasa with 2.7 million inhabitants. Mid 1993 estimates by the World Bank: projected
an annual population growth rate of about 3% which will bring the population of the
country to 50 million by the year 2000 (Eill, 1995: 10).
Perhaps the most effective way of painting a current picture of socio-economic conditions
of DRC is to make some simple comparison with the similar conditions in South Africa.
There are 47 million Zairians living in 2,267 thousand m2 ofwhom only 29% are living
in urban centers, compared to 39 million South Africans living in 1,221 thousand m2, of
whom 50% live in urban centers. In 1997, the real GDP per capita in Zaire was $355
which is more than 12 times less than that of South Africa's $4,334. Zaire's external debt,
in the same year, was 128% of its GNP compared to South Africa's 18%. All human
development indicators including life expectancy, infant mortality, education index, adult
literacy, etc point that DRC is doing worse than South Africa (although South African
indicators would be different if they were to be racially disaggregated). The most striking
differences are in the field of consumption. The implication of the almost total lack of
means of communication for those living outside the country is the near impossibility of
keeping in touch with the friends and family at home (see table 2).
Currency:
The Congolese franc was devalued in 1967 and a non-convertible unit, the Zaire (Z) was
subsequently introduced. The story of this currency is one of unbelievable instability.
The Z: $ rate went form 0.5: 1 in 1976 to over a million: 1 in 1993 when New Zaire (NZ)
was introduced at a rate of 1,000,000 Z to one NZ (Eill, 1995: 11). The devaluation has
continued. In January 1998 the rate ofNZ: $ was 115,000: 1. On 30 June of the same
year the Congolese franc (CF) was re-introduced to replace the NZ. One CF was valued
at 100,000 NZ. In January 1999 CF: $ was 3.5 (The World Factbook, 1999: 7).
37
Table 2: Comparison of some Socio- Economic Indicators for South Africa and DRC
General/Economic indicators (1997) South Africa DRC (ex Zaire)
Population 1980 (millions) 27 27
Population 1997 (millions) 38 47
Land area (1000 m:L) 1,221 2,267
Urban Population (% oftotal) 50 29
GNP (billion $) 130.2 5.1
GNP Per Capita Ranking 45 111
Real GDP Per Capita (PPP) ($) 4,334 355
Labor Force (millions) 15 19
External Debt (% ofGNP) 18 127
Human Development Indicators (1997)
Life Expectancy at Birth (# of years) 64.1 52.4
Life Expectancy Index 0.65 0.44
Combined School Enrollment 81 41
Education Index 0.82 0.55
Adult Literacy (% of population) 81.8 77.3
Infant Mortality (per 1000 live births) 49 90
Under-weight Children Under age 5 9 34
lIDI Value 0.717 0383
Consumpti9n Indicator (1996)
No. ofRadios (per 1000 persons) 316 98
No. ofTVs (per 1000 persons) 123 44
No. of Telephone lines (per 1000 persons) 100 1
No. ofPublic Phones (per 1000 persons) 1.7 0
No. of Cell Phones (per 1000 persons) 22 0.2
No. ofIntemet Hosts (per 1000 persons) 30.67 O.
Per Capita Commercial Energy Use (kg) 2,146 45
Source: World Development Report 1998/1999 and Human Development Report 1998
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Education and Health:
With the land area more than four times that ofFrance and notoriously bad transportation
and communication networks, Zaire has very poor and patchy education and health care
services. The Zairian move towards nationalization or "Zairianization" in 1972 meant
that responsibility for state schools was largely removed from the Roman Catholic
Church. However, by 1980s it was estimated that Roman Catholic Church was still
responsible for 80% ofthe primary and 60% of secondary schools. The cutbacks in the
number of teachers, repeated strikes and walk-outs by the civil servants including the
teachers, inability of the state to pay the salaries, corruption and violence have taken their
toll on the education system of the country which had, in 1970s, earned the reputation of
being solid and ofhigh quality.
The proportion of total government expenditure allocated to education has steadily fallen
from 15.1% in 1972 to 1.4% in 1990 (EID, 1995: 10). It is not surprising that in 1990,
gross enrolment ratios for primary schools were 76% (down from 92% in 1978), and 23%
for the secondary schools (EID, 1995: 10).
The church also plays a central role in health care provision, perhaps not least because the
share of central government's expenditure for health has also shrunk steadily from 2.4%
in 1972 to 0.7% in 1990 (EID, 1995: 11).
The health concerns of the country include reduced coverage ofvaccination and a
shortage of trained health care providers. HIV/AIDS is another major concern. Zaire is
one of the most affected countries of the world. National AIDS program has estimated
more than 2 million Zairians to be HIV positive (about 5% ofthe total population).
Collapse of research efforts, the interruption ofaid disbursement and the departure of




The estimates of 1998 indicate an inflation rate of 147% (The world Factbook, 1999: 7).
Economv:
Despite the vast natural resources, in 1992, Zaire was classified by the World Bank as
the 12th poorest country in the world with a GNP of $220 per capita. The Economist
Intelligence Unit (EID) estimated GNP per capita of the country to have fallen to $125,
which makes Zaire the fourth poorest country of the world (Eill, 1995: 12).
Foreign Debt:
At the end of 1993, World Bank figures put Zaire's total external debt at $ 11.3bn, with
principal arrears amounting to $2.5bn and interest arrears to $1.8bn. Debt forgiveness by
the owners declined from $324m in 1988 to $122m in 1989, to $9m in 1990 and to zero
since (Eill, 1995: 40).
The IMF declared Zaire "ineligible for Funds" in 1991 and suspended the country's
voting rights in June 1994. World Bank followed with withdrawal of its resident mission
in January 1994, after suspending all loan commitments «Eill, 1995: 14).
5.3 THE mSTORY OF ZAIRIAN IMMIGRATION TO SOUTH AFRICA
.r<Jirian immigration to South Africa is a 1990s phenomenon. The physical distance,
different culture, climate and language, higher costs of living, restrictions which were
imposed on the place of residence ofblacks, and generally the attitude of the old regime
vis-a-vie the African immigration were sufficient deterrents for those Zairians who were
seeking to immigrate not to consider South Africa as an option. There were ample
opportunities to immigrate mostly to European destinations, particularly Belgium and
France, and to a lesser degree to Canada and United States. Besides these popular
destinations, to a more limited extent, communist countries were also open mainly to
those Zairians who..wished to continue their higher education.
40
A number of factors, including the social, political and economic upheavals of the early
1990s, combined with the closed door policy of many of the western countries and the
internal changes and crisis in the former communist countries, led to the search for
alternative ports of entry, particularly within the continent (Bouillon, 1999:34). This
coincided with the movement towards the transitional, democratically elected
government in South Africa which made it more desirable than ever before. Zairian
migration to South Africa can thus be divided into three periods. The first wave of
Zairian immigrants arrived between 1990 and 1992. The second wave comprised those
who arrived in 1993 and the third wave occurred in 1997 (Kadima, 1999: 106)
5.3.1 PRIOR TO 1990
The earliest appearance ofZairians in South Africa occurred in the1980s. Zairian
president, Mobutu Sese Seko, was one of three heads of state in French Africa (along
with Houphouet-Boigny ofeote d'Ivoire and Omar Bongo of Gabon) who broke the
OAU pact against the apartheid regime of South Mrica. Under guise of dialogue they
continued their dealings with South African government that was strongly desirous of
establishing diplomatic and commercial relationship with any country, particularly those
on the African continent. The laissez-faire attitude ofZaire, in the late 1960s and 1970s,
gradually became more cordial and overt in the 1980s to the point that South Africa
became the main exporter of food and industrial equipment to Zaire (Bouillon, 1999: 43).
Zairian migration to South Africa before 1990 was negligible. Most Zairians who came to
the country were tourists with the exception ofa few who were sent by Gecamine (the
largest and most influential copper mining company in the country) either for training or
as exchange of expertise. Added to these few were the business and political advisors of
Zairian government who came to explore potential future liaisons (Bouillon, 1999:42).
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5.3.2 THE FIRST IMMIGRATION WAYE (1990 - 1992)
The year 1990 signaled the end of single party rule ofMobutu (Movement Populaire de
la Revolution (MPR)) and the beginning of the democratic reforms imposed by the
western governments. These were deemed necessary, as a part of the structural
adjustments required, to change the disastrous policies of the last two decades of
mismanagement of finances and other resources. The result was conflict and chaos at all
levels of state's function. Countrywide the middle class and the intellectuals were the
hardest hit. Those were, therefore, the first group who tried to immigrate to the
traditional destinations in Europe such as Belgium and France and even further to the
North American havens of Canada and the United States. However, along with
insistence on structural changes, the western states had finally decided to take a harder
line against Mobutu's repeated and flagrant violations of human rights and they started to
close the gates to applicants for immigration (Bouillon, 1999: 42)..
During 1991 the army massacred civilians and looted, pillaged and destroyed the means
of production all across the country (particularly in September and October). Such
atrocities resulted in unprecedented social, economic and political crisis (Kadima 1999:
110). At the same time some countries evacuated their embassy staff while others
reduced their staff and functions to a minimum. They stopped issuing visas to all those
who wished to leave. This along with the rapidly worsening conditions of life in Zaire
made South Africa a more attractive destination. Particularly because at the time Zairians
did not have to worry about a visa as it was issued to them at any port of entry upon
arrival. Kadima and Kalombo (1995) estimate the number ofZairians in South Africa at
the end of 1992 to be around 23000 (Kadima, 1999: 108). This estimate, however, seems
quite high considering the statistics of the UNHCR, which indicates the accumulative
number of refugee applications received from the Zairian refugees in South Africa from
1993 till the end ofDecember 1999 to be 8,412 (Appendix 6).
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5.3.3 THE SECOND IMMIGRATION WAVE (1993)
Within Zaire the situation had calmed itself somewhat when Etiene Tshisekedi was
elected by the popular vote of the National Conference as the Prime Minister of the
transitional government. This improved the social and political stability of the country
during the later part of 1992. However, when he was fired by Mobutu in 1993, monetary
boycotts and financial crisis followed and lead to more looting by the soldiers and finally
to the mutiny of the army (Kadima, 1999: 107). By then, political instability, cyclical
ethnic violence, a paralyzed economy and social unrest characterized the daily life of
Zairians. Anyone of these conditions by itself is a strong enough factor to push large
numbers towards any place that offers a semblance of stability and security. The large
number ofZairians who fled their country during this period and sought refuge in the
neighboring countries such as Angola, Zambia, Tanzania and Congo was a ready
testimony to this. The number ofZairians who entered South African borders was very
small compared to the numbers who fled to immediate neighboring countries. However,
there was a large increase in the number ofarrivals from the previous year (Kadima,
1999: 109).
Another event that made 1993 the year of the greatest influx ofZairians to South Africa
was the massacre ofZairians in Luanda. This was caused by the escalation of civil war in
Angola after the Unita rebels ofJonas Savimbi rejected the result of the 1992 election.
Zairian President, Marshal Mobutu was accused of supporting the rebels and
consequently the Zairian refugees became the targets of retaliatory actions and events
which took the lives of thousands, and led others to move in search of safety (Bouillon,
1999: 46). This brought some ofthem to South Africa.
Ifthe first wave ofZairian immigrants was mainly composed of the middle class
professional, the second wave was a mixed group of all ages from all strata of society.
From 1994 to 1996 the numbers of the Zairians entering South Africa decreased greatly
(Kadima, 1999: 108). This was mostly because of certain internal and external policy
changes. For instance, from April 1993 the South African government imposed the
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condition of obtaining of visa before arrival in South Africa. The visa had to be obtained
in Kinshasa after depositing $1,000, which could only be reclaimed by the depositor after
his/her return. This amount was later raised to $2,000 (Bouillon, 1999: 45).
Also, after Kengo Wa Dondo became the head ofgovernment in Zaire, many of the
western governments softened their attitude towards Zaire and made it easier for Zairians
to obtain visas (either student visa or refugee status) from Kinshasa (Bouillon 1999: 43).
Another factor was that many Zairians realized that South Africa was not going to be the
land of opportunity for them. They realized that the new government had inherited the
problems of poverty and exclusion of the majority ofthe population. The limited
resources of the government thus had to be committed to rectify the injustices of the past
and thus there would be little left for any outsider (Kadima, 1999: 108)
5.3.4 THE THIRD IMMIGRATION WAVE (1997)
In May 1997 Lauran Kabila and his rebel army overthrew Marshal Mobutu. It was finally
time for those officials loyal to Mobutu's regime and their families to leave. These were,
of course, the most prepared among all the Zairian emigrants for such a move. Many of
them had already bought properties and had invested in lucrative businesses in South
Africa and were the most welcomed among the immigrants (Kadima, 1999: 108). This
group mostly entered South Africa not as refugees but as immigrants welcomed for the
investment and the capital they brought to the country.
5.4 JOURNEY TO SOUTH AFRICA AND LEGAL STATUS
Since the beginning of the new regime of refugee acceptance by South Africa, Zaire has
been on the list of the states whose nationals would be granted asylum. This list also
includes Angola, Somalia, Ethiopian, Burundi and Rwanda. The Durban Refugee Center
deals primarily with refugees from Angola, Somalia and DRC. These three countries,
according to Mr. Hurburun the Home Affairs officer, have ''Prima Facie refugee status"
which means anyone who can prove that he is a national of these countries is
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automatically recognized as a refugee and might be granted asylum. In other words they
do not have to prove the existence of particular danger and/or threat against themselves.
Although the department ofRome Affairs may recognize the refugee status of a person it
may choose not to grant them asylum. This is particularly applicable when the rule of
country of first asylum is applied.
This is one of the ironies of the refugee situation. Most refugee-generating situations are
the consequence of the intolerable conditions at the country of origin which sends large
number of people out of their homes and to the closest place of safety, which often is one
of the neighboring countries. Because of general ignorance as to their options, rights and
responsibilities as refugees or asylum seekers on one hand and the often chaotic situation,
lack of infrastructure and inability of the receiving country to cope with large numbers of
refugees on the other, it takes months for the refugees to figure out the proper procedures
for applying for asylum and to settle in South Africa. By then the very same
circumstances that repel them from home have brought others as well. This exacerbates
the situation in the host country and often ends in pushing large numbers towards
alternative refuges.
South Africa grants the refugees in this situation a Temporary Permit to Prohibited
Person (TPPP). The advantage of this permit is that the holder is allowed to stay in South
Africa and as long as he renews his permit, he will not be repatriated or deported to his
country of origin. The holder of the TPPP is also permitted to seek employment or study
in South Africa. The disadvantages include the connotations that go with the term
"prohibited person" which often discourage employers to hire them and most banks and
financial institutions to grant them loans or allow them to open accounts, etc. The
~porary nature of the permit, which has to be renewed every three months, is another
-disadvantage. The holder of this permit is neither a refugee nor an asylum seeker, and as
such is not eligible for a change of status after a prolonged stay in the country nor would
he/she receive a travel document.
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Out of923 2 application for asylum from Zairians in Durban, only 118 cases have been
granted refugee status since 1993 (Appendix 6). The rest are holders of the temporary
permits. Like the majority of their compatriots, all the participants of the focus group as
well as 9 out of 10 of those interviewed hold TPPPs, which have to be renewed every
three months. In the case ofZairians the reason for non-granting of asylum is mainly
because South Africa is not their country offirst asylum. As is the case of9 out of 10
interviewees, they have spent various amounts of time, from a few days to over a year, in
each of the countries on their route: Zambia; Tanzania; Malawi; Zimbabwe;
Mozambique; and Swaziland. At each step of the journey either the receiving country
could not absorb any more in-coming refugees or there was no more room in the refugee
camps. The conditions of the camps were another factor in the continuous search an
move southward. Upon arrival in South Africa, however, the very circumstances that
allow for their recognition as refugees in dire need of assistance and protection, becomes
the cause of their deprivation of the asylum seeker status.
According to those interviewed, it is relatively easy to get the TPPP and to renew it every
three months (it only takes a few hours on the day of renewal). This encourages the
holders to diligently go to Home Affairs Office for renewal and not to jeopardize their
permit.
Although there are stories of security police's random checks of the foreigners and the
detention of those who do not carry their permits at the time by the police, usually those
who are detained get permission to make a phone call immediately and are freed as soon
as someone brings their documents. Only one ofthose interviewed had ever been
detained in this manner but it is interesting that none of the interviewees consider such
random checks or detentions as illegal or cause for concern. They regard it quite normal
for the police to want to find and detain the "illegals".
:2 Appendix 6 reflects the cumulative number of the nationals from DRC. Since the country was called Zaire
till 1997 and DRC since then, the correct number of Zairian refugees must combine the number of those
listed under Zaire with those listed under Congo.
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One of the most disturbing findings of the study is the complete ignorance of those
interviewed of their legal status. Except for one person who had a one-year Certificate of
Exemption (see below), the other 9 interviewees and all five of those who participated in
the focus group, are all holders of TPPPs, which have to be renewed every three months
before the expiration date. On this permit it is indicated that the holder is permitted to
seek work or study. They all assume that this permit is au lieu of a refugee visa or an
asylum seeker permit. This is a false assumption. The government of South AfricaJ
provides this permit to those whom it acknowledges as refugees but refuses to grant(
asylum because ofthe clause of "country of first asylum".
Another wrong assumption held by a majority of interviewed Congolese is that after 3 to
5 years of holding their temporary permit they will be eligible for permanent residence
status. There are no such provisions in the 1995 ACAA except for those holders of the
refugee status or the Exemption Certificate. The new Refugee Act ofDecember 98
which will come to effect from April 2000, allows those who have had a valid asylum
seeker's permit for five uninterrupted years to apply for permanent residence, but this
mayor may not include all those who hold a TPPP. The practical details of the new
regulations particularly as relates to those holders of the TPPP are not as yet clear
(personal interview with Mr. Kandi Hurburun).
Only one of the interviewees had a "Certificate ofExemption" which means a refugee
status. Another one of those interviewed was granted a Certificate ofExemption at first
(shortly after his arrival) which was valid for one year, however, after the expiration of
that certificate it was not renewed and he was given a TPPP which he has been obhge
renew every three months ever since. No explanation was given to him as the reason for
the change in his status. In the interview with the Home Affairs Officer, Mr. Cowan
(pers. Corn.), however, it was explained that in order to renew the Certificate of
Exemption, the refugee has to re-apply by writing a statement and provide proof of the
continued legitimacy ofhis/her demand for refugee status. Meanwhile, the department
issues him/her a TPPP till such time as his/her request is re-examined. Unfortunately, this
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procedure is not explained to the refugees and they are not made aware of the steps they
have to take in order to secure their refugee status.
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CHAPTER SIX: SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CIRCUMSTANCES OF
CONGOLESE REFUGEES IN DURBAN
6.1 EMPLOYMENT SITUATION OF THE STUDY GROUP
Among the 10 interviewees were: a veterinarian doctor; an assistant pharmacist; a high
school science teacher; a primary school teacher; one with a degree in commerce who
was a gold prospector; a carpenter; a tailor; a body guard; and a mechanic. Ofthese, three
are presently engaged as security guards/night watches, two have their own barbershops,
one is in import/export business, one has just finished his university education
(University ofNatal), and three are unemployed.
In the course of interviews it became clear that by unemployment they meant formal
employment. The latter three were previously engaged as security guards and have been
retrenched in the last year. All three of them, as well as two of the employed security
guards, are actively involved in small business ofvarious kinds.
The situation of the newcomers is somewhat different. Four out of 5 participants of the
focus group are working as car watches during the day. Only one of them is running a
barbershop. None of them appear to be involved in the small business, although one of
them said that he was trying to raise the capital for starting a small appliance repair shop.
Of those married men who were interviewed the majority (4 out of 6) said that their
wives do not work regularly and the most often cited reason for it was fear of violence
and maltreatment. Most of the Zairian women who do work are in the informal sector and
sell second hand cloths and shoes. The situation seems to be different for the newcomers.
Some ofthe more recently arrived women are getting involved in car watching which is
not a typical line ofwork for Zairian women. This is perhaps because the security work,
which was a main source of employment for men, is not so readily available anymore.
The steady, regular employment usually provides the very small starting capital needed
for engaging in variety of business activities such as sale of new or second hand goods.
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Now that such employment is not available other strategies are considered and some
younger women engage in non-traditional roles such as car watching along with their
husbands or other family members
Not one of those participating in the study was happy with their current employment
situation. Security work in Zaire is reserved for older, illiterate men who have no other
skills or means of supporting themselves. Hairdressing is also at the bottom ofthe list of
professions for young and educated men. In answer to the question ''Would you be doing
your present work in your own country?" all of the interviewees responded no. When
asked what would they like to do if they had the.choice, 8 out of 10 responded that they
would like to work in their own field of experience. Two of the interviewees who are
young men that run barbershops wanted to continue their studies. One of them,
"Michael" said: "IfI don't study and learn a profession, till when can I cut hair for 10
Rand? What will I be doing when I am 40 and have a family to take care on"
6.2 SOUTH AFRICAN EMPLOYMENT SITUATION
Apartheid policies and practices such as: the Land Act of 1913, which removed the
property rights and controlled the residential areas, the Native (Urban Areas) Act of
1923, which controlled the movement of the African people to and from urban areas, job
reservation policies, which denied Africans the right to many industrial activities
(Manning and Mashigo 1993), pass laws, Group Areas Act (1950), harsh licensing and
zoning regulations, systematically deprived black South Africans of an access to a whole
range of experiences vital to building a successful entrepreneurial tradition (Lund,
1998:8), which in turn is so vital for development ofvibrant informal economy. "The
very existence of an informal sector was regarded as affront to the managers of apartheid
urbanization" (Rogerson, 1992: 163). This resulted in lack of access to formal education
and skills for majority of the African population along with lack of access to positions of
influence and authority in firms, and the development ofnetworks of support in the
business community (Manning and Mashigo, 1994: 31).
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The reform climate of 1980s and 1990s, however, has led to strategies for "re-formation
and re-structuring" of the urban informal economy in South Africa (Rogerson: 1992:
165). The new policies have turned to viewing development of the informal economy as
the solution to the unemployment problem that presently threatens the economy ofthe
country. Since the publication of 1995 Business Act and the white paper on National
Strategy for the Development and Promotion of Small Business in South Africa, the state
has been committed to creation of enabling environment for the development of small
enterprises including that of the survivalists and micro-enterprises as well as medium
enterprises.
The distinct problem of informal sector in South Mrica is the underdevelopment of its
production sphere, which as mentioned before, is, to some degree, the historical product
of apartheid planning. Among the main reasons for this underdevelopment is the lack of
artisanal, technical and managerial skills (Rogerson and de Silva 1988: 166).
Another area of concern for the present economic well being of the country is the
emigration problem, better known as brain drain of skilled and professional people to
other countries. Official statistics do not reflect the seriousness of the problem, as many
of the emigrants do not declare their intention to leave the country indefinitely, however
the loss has been significant. The ambiguous and peculiar attitude of South Africa to the
migration issue has led, on one hand, the private sector, as well as the government, to
bemoan the loss of large number of skilled professional. On the other hand, it has failed
to recognize the wealth of knowledge and skill of large number of the migrants including
the refugees, and to utilize these to their full potential.
A study conducted by SAMP in Johannesburg in 1997 concluded that far from stealing
South African's jobs, immigrant entrepreneurs create employment for local people
(Rogerson, 1997). They also found that most of the migrants from non-SADC countries
financed their businesses from the funds they brought into South Africa from outside and
at least half of them re-invested capital in further expansion and/or diversification
(Rogerson, 1997: 17). This means that immigrants living in South Africa play an active
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role in the overall economy ofthe country. The case of those Zairians interviewed for thi
study is a proof of existence of this untapped source of human resources. Their role as
consumers of locally produced goods and services and contributors to the earnings of the
state, both through direct and indirect taxes, is easy to observe. It is their other
contribution, namely as active economic agents and human resources, however, that is
much more needed and beneficial to the social and economic development of the country.
Here is a group of people with a long history of diverse ideas and experiences in both the
formal and informal economy. They have the vision to start, the experience to run, the
education and skills necessary to do well in, and the drive and desire to take risks and
work hard to succeed in different areas ofbusiness. As was mentioned before, among the
interviewees were a veterinarian doctor, an assistant pharmacist, a high school science
teacher, a primary school teacher, someone with a degree in commerce who was a gold
prospector, a carpenter, a tailor, a body guard and a mechanic. These are human
resources readily available, able and willing to work hard and contribute to the well being
of any community in which they live; people who do not ask anyone for any handouts
and assistance beyond a valid work permit and an opportunity to compete in the market.
Unfortunately, the hostile environment, lack of proper documentation, cooperation and
trust of the local population, as well as inability to gain access to credit and informatio
makes it almost impossible for Zairians to expand or seriously get into any viable J:1
business ventures. A prime example is "Remi" a 37 year old father of4, who spends 12
hours a day at his job as a night security. During the day he buys cheap new or second
hand shoes (value between R5 to R15 each), which he then fixes up and covers with
various types of attractive material. This is pasted and/or sewn by hand on the shoes and
the finished product is sold for R20 to R35. The finished product is a beautiful fashion
shoe, which could be sold at any fancy shoe store for 10 times that price. This should be a
prime example of a success story, but it isn't. According to Remi he is not able to sell his
shoes or expand this into a more profitable venture for the following reasons:
• He does not have the right ID that allows permission for setting up a stall where he
can sell his shoes except in the flea market on Sundays. But on Sundays the
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competition is fierce, the tables are more expensive and often he cannot afford the
fees.
• He can not carry more than a few pairs of his shoes at a time, because if he does, it
will make him a target for the criminals who will steal his shoes. He has been beaten
up and his merchandise stolen before.
• People generally don't like to buy from the foreigners. He once tried to form a
partnership with a local South African. He was to make the shoes and the partner was
to sell them and they were to split the profit. Unfortunately, the partner took a bag full
of shoes and disappeared. Now he would not trust anyone but his wife to sell the
shoes.
• Because his security job provides the household with its only source of regular
income, he spends 12 hours a day at it plus the two hours oftravelling to and from
work. This leaves him with little time to make his shoes.
These reasons plus the inability to get loans or cooperation from South Africans make
ventures into business very small, slow and frustrating. It is not surprising that most of
the business is done within the Zairian community and sometimes in exchange for
services or other commodities. For example, one pair ofRemi's shoes went to the lady
who did special hairdos for the women ofthe household.
The second story is that of "John" who had a degree in commerce from University of
Kinshasa and has just finished another degree in social sciences at the University of
Natal. He is very pessimistic about finding an office or formal job. So, along with two
other Zairian refugees, one of whom is a civil engineer who graduated from a Zairian
University and was unable to find any work in his professional field in South Africa, and
another who is presently student at Natal University, they have started a construction and
remodeling company. They have all the right ideas about how to start and expand. For
example, with the money they made from their first few jobs and their savings, they have
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purchased a van and have painted their logo on it. Using the facilities at the university,
they have made business cards and flyers that they and their friends distribute all over the
town. They give competitive prices, as they do "their homework and call around to find
out who else is doing the same job for what price". Their plan is to put 50% of the profits,
at least for the first couple of years, into buying materials and equipment.
One of their problems is that in order to carry their business further they need a local
partner. Unfortunately, they don't trust anyone. Last year they started the process but the
person who was to become their partner took the two contracts they have worked on and
went his own way. So, now they are afraid of the same thing happening again.
Another problem is their documentation. When they have made bids for bigger contracts,
although they had the best price, companies and even the government offices have
refused their bid simply because of their permit and the perception of that permit.
In addition, because two ofthe partners in this business are or were students in the Natal
University and had refugee status, they have been able to open their own bank accounts
but they have not been able to secure any loans from the banks because of their status.
This they find to be a big hurdle.
The third story is that of "Jean Pierre" who is a veterinarian doctor with many years of
experience both as a professor and as a private practitioner. He can not secure any jobs in
his professional field. So, he ended up taking a training course for becoming a security
guard. With two wives, 8 children and a number of people who come to him for
assistance, he soon left that line of work which he originally considered to be "a secure
source of income" and started buying and selling items in small way. As he enjoys a high
place of respect in the Zairian community, mainly because of his age (he is 50 years old
and one of the elders of the community), his education and social background and
especially his charismatic personality, he has a well established network of contacts and
informants that helped him start his import/export business. This business which started
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small now extends to several countries in the region as is done through various travellers
and informal traders that deal with him.
His main problems are very similar to those ofRemi and John. Lack of proper
documents, especially a travel document, lack of access to loans and mistrust and fear of
violence hinder his business plans which could easily expand.
As the three cases mentioned above demonstrate, there are good odds that if the refugee
community was encouraged and assisted in a meaningful way to develop their small
enterprises, they would become economic role players and even sources of employment
for others. Zairians are good business people mainly because of the social and economic
situation of their country in the past couple of decades, which made it difficult to survive
without getting involved in private business and informal economy. This is a valuable
skill they bring with them to this country, a skill that should be taken advantage of rather
than being allowed to go to waste. As more and more people lose their formal
employment in this country, there would be a growing need for creating a flourishing and
expanding informal sector to absorb them. To that end, there should be concerted efforts
to encourage and foster those who have the vision, the idea, the skill and the drive to
develop small businesses and enterprises, no matter from where they come. Harnessing
refugees' talents, knowledge, skills and experiences could only be of mutual benefit.
6.3 XENOPHOBIA AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE LIVES OF THE REFUGEES
There are many misconceptions about the role that immigrants play and the potential
dangers of their involvement in the domestic economy and the general well being of the
republic. These fears are mostly created by the alarmist journalism, which reports the
inaccurate statistics as to the number of migrants, particularly those of the undocumented
cases, and the lengths some ofthem go to in order to secure employment. Adding to this
group is the voice of the politicians who for reasons of their own are often looking for
scapegoats to blame for situation of the economy and other social and public service
blunders.
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The most common misconceptions regarding the African immigrants are that:
• Their numbers are phenomenally high and thus potentially detrimental to
development plans of the RDP
• They steal South African jobs and thus create unemployment for the local population
• They are criminal elements who contribute to the hard crime climate of the country
• They are mostly young, unskilled and uneducated adventurers looking for easier and
better jobs and lives in South Africa (economic refugees)
• They all want to become South African citizens and beneficiaries of the social
security and assistance reserved for citizens
6.3.1 REFUGEES' EXPERIENCES OF INTERACTION WITH THE PUBLIC
The ironic fact is that all of those interviewed run away from their native country because
of instability, violence and conflict. For many ofthem the new South Africa represented a
place of order, stability and of a government of the people, all the things they had been
deprived of at home. As one of the interviewees put it "our culture teaches us to be kind
and generous to strangers amidst us, and consider them as our guests". They are thus
puzzled and hurt when they are confronted with hostility and constant cry of
''Kwerekwere go home!".
One of the interviewees, "Valentine", was a security guard and thought he had a good
relationship with everyone. His boss was happy with him, he had found a Zulu girlfriend
and life seemed to be going well. Then he discovered that three other security guards
were planning to kill him. He confronted them and found out that this was true, so he had
to quit his job because he did not want to live in the constant fear of being killed by his
own colleagues. Another interviewee, Roman is a 19-year-old Zairian who has a
barbershop near the market. He has been robbed at gunpoint three times in the last year.
His friend was shot and wounded at the third incident. He is convinced that he has been
targeted because he is a foreigner and even when he reports this incidents to the police,
there is little they do to apprehend the culprits.
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Each of the interviewees had his own personal stories of the hostile ways that people
have treated him or someone he knows. The most common abuse is calling them
"makwerekwere", "a word that mocks the sound of their languages" (Madywabe,
1997:6). They laugh as they recount the stories and the insults, but the amusement is not
reflected in their eyes. They conflrmed that they are commonly accused of taking South
Africans' jobs and women. However, only 30% of those interviewed were employed as
security (night watch). Forty percent were unemployed and survived from small informal
business and 30% were self-employed (two own barbershops and one does an
import/export business).
Signiflcant numbers ofZairians, soon after arrival, gained employment as security guards
or hairdressers, lines of work that traditionally was not done by black South African men.
However, according to those interviewed, because of the worsening unemployment
situation in the country, the companies are coming_under increasing pressure from other
workers and unions not to hire foreigners.
The unions have shown mixed and often contradictory reactions to the question of
migrant workers, illegal aliens and the foreign workers generally. COSATU at its
international policy conference on 22 April 1995 adopted certain recommendations which
reflect these ambiguities. They included the following policy statements:
• It is the duty of all governments to provide work for their own citizens
• The problem of immigration can only be solved by a coordinated regional and
international strategy
• The Aliens Control Act should be scrapped
• A regional Reconstruction and Development Program should be developed; and
• There should be fair and proper control of entry of migrant workers into host
countries. (Minaar and Hough, 1996: 200)
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On the one hand, they called for imposition of heavy penalties on those who employed
and exploited undocumented aliens. Also the recommendation to scrap Aliens Control
Act was followed by replacement of that act with more humane and internationally
acceptable legislation that would provide "fair and proper control of entry of migrant
workers into South Africa" (Minaar and Hough, 1996: 201). On the other hand, emphasis
on government duty to provide work for their own citizens implied that South Africans
should get preference to foreigners in obtaining jobs. This requires the identification of
the non South Africans in order to exclude them from the job market or placing them
second, behind the South African citizens. There was also much concern about the ability
of the government to deliver housing and social services in presence of large number of
migrants (Minaar and Hough, 1996: 198).
Not only there is ambiguity in the national unions position vis-a.-vis the foreign or
migrant workers; there are also tensions between local COSATU branches and the
National Executive. For instance, the COSATU branch in Pietermaritzburg has
repeatedly threatened to hold a one-day general strike over the illegal aliens issue
(Minaar and Hough, 1996: 199)
Two ofthe Zairians who were interviewed mentioned that they were retrenched because
ofpressure from the union to replace them with local workers. Some of the comments in
the focus group discussion also indicated that newly arriving Congolese have little hope
of finding security jobs and the market is already saturated with existing barbershops,
therefore, they mostly get involved in car watching instead.
As far as the accusation about stealing South African women is concerned, 7 out of 10
interviewees were married to or living with Zairian women. Two out often however,
were living with Zulu ladies who have borne them children. They consider the
relationships to be of mutual benefit rather than stealing someone else's property and
privilege.
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Several of those interviewed indicated that Zulu women are much kinder and more
sympathetic towards them, but because of this they are confronted with more hostility
from men. The two interviewees who have local South African girlfriends indicated that
since they have learned Zulu and have good relationship with the families of their
girlfriends, they are able to communicate with the neighbors in their own language and
they do not feel as if they have any problems with them. This indicates the significant
role of communication in the process of integration.
6.3.2 REFUGEES' EXPERIENCE OF DEALING WITH GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS
There is a wealth of research done by different organizations such as SAMP (1996, 1998,
1999), School of Government in University of Western Cape (1994, 1996, 1998), Human
Rights Watch (1998), and IFAS (1999), that indicates widespread corruption of
government officials and violation of human rights particularly of the illegal immigrants
(mostly from SADC region). It is interesting to note that the majority of these studies are
carried out in the Gauteng area including Johannesburg which as the capital of the
country attracts the largest number of immigrants.
All those Zairian refugees in Durban who were interviewed, both in individual interviews
and the focus group, however, indicated that they had no negative experiences with
Home Affairs officers. Apparently, the Congolese get their temporary permits rather
easily. All those interviewed have presented themselves to the Home Affairs office
within 24 hours of their arrival in Durban. They received their permits on the same day,
after waiting between 2 to 4 hours and going through an interview, usually about two
hours long. There were two exceptions, however. One person had a 3-day permit first and
then received his 3 month long TPPP and another one received a two week permit first
and then the 3 month permit. None of them had experienced any harassment, been asked
for illegal payments, and had never been subjected to rude or undignified behavior from
any of the officers. A few, however, mentioned a "rude and loud" lady in the office.
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The difference perhaps is, as mentioned before, due to the fact that Zairians are not
among the "illegals". Also, Zairian immigrants do not have a criminal image. Unlike
Nigerians who are associated with the illegal drug trade, Mozambicans who are looked
upon as car thieves, and Senegalese who are associated with selling counterfeit goods,
Congolese are not perceived to have association with crime. This does not mean that
there are no criminals in the Congolese community, rather that the perception of the
South Africans does not connect them with any particular criminal activities. The only
"crime" they are often accused of is stealing South African jobs as well as their women.
This, however, is an accusation made about all African immigrants.
Another reason that Zairian refugees have not been subjected to much official
harassment, discrimination or abuse of their human rights might be due to the small
number of refugees in KwaZulu Natal (KZN). Although the borders are easy to cross and
as a result large numbers of people, particularly from Mozambique, enter the country
through KZN, comparatively few stay in the province. Since 1993, the total number of
refugee applications received by Durban Refugee Reception Center (DRRC) has been
2,669 (Appendix 6) compared to 59,426 in UNHCR statistics (appendix 5) for all of
South Africa. The Zairian refugee community is the largest refugee community in
Durban followed by those from Burundi and Rwanda. Thirty five percent of all the
refugees in KZN are Zairians (Appendix 6).
6.3.3 THE NEED FOR TRAINING OF OFFICIALS IN HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES
The policies of the democratic government of South Africa have gone through
tremendous shifts and changes since 1994; however, the current immigration laws are
still deeply rooted in the racial and political history of the country. Although a Refugee
Bill was passed by parliament in December 1998, it has yet to be implemented. The law
under which refugees and asylum seekers are treated is the 1995 ACAA. Although some
of the more obvious violations of the rights of the undocumented or "illegal" immigrants
have been removed from the Act, it is still not geared towards the recognition and
welcome ofthe refugees or asylum seekers. The latter are still handled under '1he
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prohibited person" which comes with a heavy dose of negative associations including
those of «undesirable person".
It is not surprising therefore, that some of those in charge of dealing and handling the
affairs of refugees, asylum seekers and/or other categories of immigrants might still carry
the old attitudes and philosophy. The recent research conducted by various research
groups such as SAMP, Human Rights Watch and IFAS testifies to these repeated
violations and inability to adjust to the new situation.
The case in Durban might well be different however. All those interviewed either
privately or in the focus group indicated overall positive experiences with the Home
Affairs Officers. Although they have to renew their permits every three months, an
activity that usually takes up a large portion of their day, they consider the situation to be
fair. As was mentioned before, the main reason for the positive experience of Congolese
refugees is because of the blanket coverage ofZairian nationals as refugees.
If the Department ofHome Affairs is to handle the ever increasing number ofvarious
categories of immigrants that are coming in, efficiently and in timely manner, they need
to have a proactive strategy instead of a reactive one. As in almost all other arenas of
public endeavor, prevention seems to be better than trying to cure the ills after they
happen. One of the great drains in resources of the department is dealing with
infringement of laws which are caused by ignorance. Training the Home Affairs Officers
and bringing them up to date with the national and international trends in immigration
movements, legal and humanitarian handling of different cases and propagation ofvital
information about rights, privileges and responsibilities inherent in each category of
immigration, could save a great deal of time and energy and scarce resources that are
allocated to the department.
6.4 FORMATION OF INFORMAL SOCIAL NETWORKS
The xenophobic sentiment, which permeates the country, has created several
misconceptions as to the role and the impact of the African immigrants and particularly
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ofthe refugees on the national economy. The most commonly held notions of
"foreigners" is that of criminals, uneducated, low class elements that are a threat to South
Africans' jobs, women, security and health. The typical association ofNigerian with drug
dealing, Senegalese with dealing in counterfeit goods, and all African nationals with
AIDS, is but the tip of the iceberg.
A hostile environment and the lack of public sector infrastructure and NGOs to help the
asylum seekers and refugees to settle in their adopted country results in the formation of
informal national and/or tribal networks of assistance. Although many ofthose
interviewed have received assistance from religious organizations such as the Muslim
Agency, the Ark (a Christian organization for the homeless and the needy) Mormon
Church and the Baha'! community, this assistance in most cases is short-term and very
limited in scope. For instance, the Muslim Agency provided five out often of the
interviewees with two to three weeks of hospitality, but after that period there were no
more assistance available except for one person who is a Muslim himself. A similar
situation was experienced with the Ark, although the duration of stay in their dormitory
was not pre-determined. None ofthose who availed themselves of the Ark's services
stayed beyond three weeks and received no other assistance beside food and shelter. The
case ofMormon Church and the Baha'! community was different, as they were
instrumental in finding jobs and accommodation for those refugees who belonged to their
communities (one each). This was perhaps due to the limited number of refugees
belonging to these communities. Because of the limited number of those receiving their
assistance, they might be able to assist them for longer periods and in more effective
ways.
Beside the religious organizations and their charity work, there have been very few
refugee centered NGOs acting in Durban. From 1994 to 1996 UNHCR were
collaborating with the Jesuit Center in some refugee relief activities. The Red Cross
replaced the Jesuit Center in 1997. None of the interviewees knew about the former and
only three knew ofthe latter. The Red Cross' refugee relief activities were limited to
distribution of care packages among the refugees. These packages included some basic
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food items and some items for personal hygiene. The packages however, were not
uniform or standard and thus every refugee would receive different items. Even more
discouraging was that there were not enough packages for everyone, so it was possible
for some people to go to the distribution centre and wait there for hours and still come out
empty handed. This created a feeling of discrimination and unequal treatment.
The collaboration ofUNHCR and Red Cross was dissolved in early 1999. From January
2000, UNHCR has started collaboration with Durban Refugee Forum, which is quite a
controversial organization as far as the Zairian community is concerned. Eight out of 10
interviewees knew about the Refugee Forum but had never received any assistance from
them and view this organization as corrupt and discriminatory. One of the leaders of the
Zairian community has taken up a petition against the Forum. He and his group have
proposed a new mandate and constitution for the Forum, which they would like to be
proportionally representative of the refugee communities. They have accused some
members of its board of directors of misappropriation of funds and have asked for their
removal from office. A Zairian who had been volunteering with the Forum in the past and
had been "kicked out of his position now that it has become a paying job" (Mr. Kasongo,
Pers. Corn.). Another Zairian who had applied for one of the newly created positions wasJ
ignored and was replaced by an allegedly less qualified South African, is considering
taking action against the Forum (Anonymous, Pers. Corn.).
Every single one of those interviewed had either been the recipient or the provider of
hospitality, accommodation and/or job information and/or references for or from other
Zairians. This has made them all connected within the informal networks of the Zairian
community in Durban.
As the social capital theories indicate the formation of these networks and their
extensions make the task of arrival and settlement easier for subsequent arrivals and
eventually becomes a legitimate pull factor for those considering making the move from
their place of origin. What is interesting in the case of those interviewed is that the
majority of them knew about the existence of the Zairian community in Durban even
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though they had no prior contact with those who had already been settled in. However,
almost immediately upon arrival they have made contact with their fellow countrymen
and had been integrated into their network.
As was mentioned before, 7 of those interviewed did not personally know anyone who
had migrated to South Africa before them. One person knew two of his colleagues
(Zairian lecturers in the same college) who have migrated to South Africa in 1992, before
the troubles escalated in Zaire. However, these two contacts never encouraged, invited or
helped his move to South Africa and he has lost contact with them since 1993. Only one
person has been encouraged to make the move by another Zairian friend who had come
to South Africa before him. This was through letters received before 1995 in which the
friend had advised the move and promised assistance upon arrival. However, by the time
the interviewee arrived in Durban, his friend had already left for Canada.
Eight of those interviewed had no contact address in South Africa, although many of
them were informed by other Zairians, who they met along their journey, of the general,
areas in Johannesburg and Durban where the Zairians lived. It seems almost inevitable
that when they arrive their main source ofassistance, both in terms of finding their way
around as well as for the actual details ofgetting accommodation, jobs, etc, to be the
network of their compatriots who have arrived before them and are willing and able t6
offer assistance.
It is interesting to note that most of the people are immediately and intimately attracted to
and involved with their ethnic or tribal networks, first and foremost. This perhaps is quite
normal particularly for those who are running away from ethnic conflicts back at their
own country of origin. They may have witnessed and been subjected to tribal clashes and
persecution that makes them not to feel safe or comfortable with the other tribes or
groups. Added to this is the fact that the sense of a national identity is not yet well
developed in Zaire. Ethnic, and parti~ular1y tribal, identity is still very dominant in Zaire
which since its inception as an independent country has gone through a number ofbloody
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tribal clashes. Numerous rumors of separatism and independence of the five major
provinces, on basis of tribal lines, have spread periodically.
The largest group ofZairian refugees with longest history of settlement in Durban
originally came from the province ofKivu. These are the only refugees that have already
formed smaller self-help social groups and mutuals that are functioning among the
Kivutian community. These associations and mutuals are divided along smaller tribal
groups and quite exclusive in their membership. They formed the only representation of
Congolese in the Refugee Forum, the result has been a great deal of distress and
suspicion for Congolese who are not from Kivu. They have even threatened to boycott
the activities of the Forum.
Because of the overwhelming hostility of the native population around them, however,
for the first time the community is considering coming together as Congolese community
ofDurban. There have been tentative meetings to bring together the representatives of all
the major groups ofZairian refugees. In addition to the Kivutians, they comprise mainly
the Kasaians who mostly lived in Likasi, Lubumbashi or in the capital, Kinshasa.
When asked who they hosted in their homes or helped to find jobs for, all those
interviewed said that they would do it for any Zairian without distinction ofwhere they
come form, but the personal observation of the author during the interviews, when the
family was hosting a guest, was that those who stayed with the interviewee's family were
usually from the same tribe as the host. In other words Kivutians were hosting other
Kivutians and Kasaians hosted other Kasaians. The exception is that most of those
interviewed had also helped out or willing to help out Rwandan and Burundian refugees.
This perhaps could be a very interesting and significant future study because one of the
more notable problems of the immigrant communities is the lack of collaboration and
formation of mutually beneficial groups and networks.
The reason for the openness of the Zairian community towards the Rwandan and
Burundian communities is due to the very close historical ties and relationships that have
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always existed between the Great Lake Community as well as the awareness of the
intensity of suffering that brings the people from that region so far from home.
Also of interest is the fact that the negative images associated with certain nationalities of
immigrants such as the drug connection ofNigerians, is also rife among the Zairian
community. In other words, the Zairian community, which itself suffers from false
accusation and sentiments created by xenophobia, carries some of the same sentiments
towards other nationalities, particularly those who are "illegal". They are more
sympathetic towards the plight and struggles of fellow refugees and think that all those
who are here "legally" should all be protected and given support in the same manner.
Beside the obvious advantages of such networks in assisting a newcomer to settle in a
new environment, there are disadvantages as well. The established networks of people
already living in an area transmit their attitudes, perceptions, problems and experiences to
the newcomers. It was notable that the majority of those interviewed had immediately
become employed in one of the two most common job categories ofZairian refugees,
namely security work and hair cutting.
Even those with particular professional skills such as pharmacology and auto repair did
not search for jobs in their own field of expertise. This, to a great extent, might be
because in reality there were very few jobs available and very few employers consider
giving them to foreigners. But perhaps to some extent it is also because, those
professional Zairians who arrived first did not find jobs in their own fields and had to go
for one or other of the above mentioned lin~s of work which were open to them at the
time. Consequently they discourage those who arrive late from ''wasting time" and
searching for anything else. This is particularly evident in the case of those who almost
immediately upon arrival got into security training. Four out of8 interviewees who do or
did security work, went for training during the first month of their arrival in Durban and 2
others within 3 months. The exception to this line of action was the carpenter who
searched and found a job in his own field but he left after 5 months because his boss
exploited him. He has been doing security work ever since.
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6.5 SOCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES
As was mentioned before, Zairians are in a unique position. Their flight out of their
native country was often a direct consequence ofvery unpleasant social, political,
environmental, and economic conditions. Their first and foremost thought at the time was
to reach a place of safety, somewhere one can survive the onslaught ofhostile forces.
They took flight, in large numbers, and took refuge in the immediate neighboring
countries. Those countries, even with the best and most humanitarian intentions, could
not accommodate the overwhelming numbers of them. As a result they were pushed back
to the next possible refuge and then to next and so on. Those who got a place in a refugee
camp in Zambia, Malawi or elsewhere, after the first few months of relief from direct
threat, realized that that situation could not be tolerated for any length. The crammed
conditions of the camps, inadequate facilities and services, particularly health and
education services for children and the depressing lack of opportunity and hope for
building a future for the young ones, made the further move as necessary as the first.
Where is the refuge to flee to? The first choice would be one of the countries of the
North. The advances made in the field of communication and information technology in
the few decades has truly made the world a global village. However, the doors to almost
all the countries of the North are closed to the majority of the refugees. They should thus
be content with countries closer to home. South Africa with its reputation as an economic
giant in Africa, the images of its modern and almost European looking cities, its new
constitution and the promise of complete change from a repressive rule to one of
democracy and freedom becomes quite an attractive destination.
So some of the Zairians arrived in South Africa after a journey that had taken them
through a minimum of three and sometimes up to seven countries and had lasted on
average one year. What happened to them? How were they integrated into the local
community? What were the conditions they were confronted with? What did they expect
from the government of their adopted country and what did they receive?
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We have already looked at the reception of the Zairian refugees and their lega
l status.
They have been recognized as refugees but the government has refused to gra
nt asylum to
the majority. In the absence of refugee facilities, however, they have been giv
en
permission to seek work and/or study.
Accommodation
All the participants lived in the Durban city centre except one who lives in Sy
denham.
The accommodation was quite diversified. The young and single refugees oft
en shared
accommodation, sometimes as many as 4 to a bedroom. Families often opted
for private
dwelling which varies from one room for a family of 8 to a 2 bedroom flat for
a couple
and their only child. The shared accommodation usually cost between R150 t
o R300 per
month per person, while flat rents go from R500 per month for a one bedroom
flat to
Rl,800 for a 4 bedroom flat.
Most of those interviewed considered accommodation to be one of the major
problems.
There were many reasons for this. The rents were high especially in the city;
places that
had cheaper rent, such as townships lacked security. Lack of safety nets creat
ed constant
fear of loosing a job or income which may result in loss of accommodation. O
ther
problems included the demand for two to three months rent in advance as a d
eposit; lack
ofwillingness of the landlords to do any maintenance and repairs needed; and
finally
unfriendly neighbors who made life more difficult especially for the children
who were
chastised whenever they played outside and/or made noise.
Half of those interviewed were unhappy with their present accommodation w
hile the
other half were satisfied. The general level of satisfaction with their present
accommodation varied from very unsatisfied (2 on scale of 1 to 10) to very sa
tisfied (9),
averaging at 5.3. The majority (7 out of 10) lived with Zairian or other refuge
es in the
neighborhood while 3 did not have any immediate Zairian neighbors.
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In answer to the question ''Is there anything that the government should do to help
immigrants with their accommodation?" a surprising 4 out of 10 responded negatively.
They considered accommodation to be the individual's problem. Also, they thought that
any help they received from the South African government would make the population
more jealous of them and more hostile towards them. The other 6 interviewees believed
that the government should help the refugees with their accommodation, especially in the
absence of any refugee relief centres or support activities available. The assistance was _
particularly important when they ftrst arrived and when they had no jobs. Suggestions for
government intervention ranged from subsidizing the rent to creating refugee shelters or
low rent accommodations for the refugees in need. One interviewee suggested
government vouchers for the deposit requested by many landlords and another suggested
an information office to help the refugees find cheap accommodation.
Education
As far as the education of children was concerned, none of the refugee families had any
problems registering their children in local schools. The children themselves however,
experienced several problems including difficulty with studying in English and making
friends with local children. Two of the interviewees mentioned their children were
sometimes beaten up on the way to school or in the school itself. Four out of6 fathers
with school age children however, indicated satisfaction with the way that the teachers
were treating their children and generally were content with the quality of education their
children received.
One of the major problems faced by parents was that of the school fees. Zairian families
are usually large: The average number ofchildren in the interviewed families (not
counting the single people who each had one child) was 5.1 ranging from a newly wed
couple with no children to a father with two wives and 11 children. Assuming that the
majority of these children are of school-going age, the families then have to worry about
tuition fees and transportation, uniforms and school materials. Considering the fact that
the majority of these families have very limited sources of income this is a major
problem. Studies have shown that there is gender speciftc treatment of children in poorer
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communities (Johnson et ai, (no year given): 35). It would be of considerable int
erest to
investigate whether the economic factors have the same effects on the refugee
communities and would lead to gender-based preferential treatment of childre
n in areas




The National Department of health does not have any written policies about t
he treatment
of refugees or asylum seekers with regards to their health care requirements. A
s there are
no demands for South African Identification Cards (ID) in many ofthe clinics
or
hospitals around the country, the refugees like other South Africans have to fo
llow the
established regulations of the health care providing institution. The refugee c
hildren
under five received free medical care, as do all other South African children.
Similarly,
pregnant women received free medical care. None of the interviewees compla
ined about
the medical services they received. Their main complaint was about long que
ues and the
high cost of some of the medication that is not provided by the hospitals or cl
inics. None
ofthose interviewed had medical insurance except for one who works as a se
curity guard
for King George Hospital.
Levelo(Satis(action
The average level of satisfaction with the quality of life in South Africa was 5
(on scale
of one to 10), compared to 6.5 average of satisfaction with the quality of life i
n Zaire
(when asked to reflect back). The major reasons for dissatisfaction were hosti
lity and
xenophobia, which manifested itself as abuse of foreigners by the locals, the f
act that
laws were not put into practice by the officials, and general level ofviolence
in the
country. This is perhaps what keeps the number of refugees down and keeps
many of
them, particularly those with families and children, from entering the country
.
As far as permanent stay in South Africa is concerned, 6 out of 10 expressed
desire to
return back to Congo when the situation has stabilized, although one of them
indicated




Migration is a complex and multi-faceted phenomenon. The movement of people in search
ofbetter opportunities, more abundant livelihood, and more secure environment is as old as
humanity itself The speed and spread ofthe movement in the recent history, however, has
been unprecedented. Never before has there been so widespread a need for safety, stability
and securing a minimal livelihood. The rigid definitions ofthe past with regard to concepts
such as refugee, asylum seeker, economic refugee, documented or undocumented migrants,
etc, have merged into many different shades ofgray which do not stand as clear cut and well
defined as before. As the global order proceeds the significance, role and authority of
national states change. Borders have lost some oftheir traditional roles and functions and
have gained some new ones, and so have border controls. New strategies are required to
confront new global challenges such as the current unprecedented population growth and
movement.
In order to formulate such strategies, however, new theoretical frameworks based on new
realities and experiences are needed. Migration, like all other coping mechanisms devised
to combat particular undesirable or difficult conditions, is a dynamic organic process. It
adapts itself to the altered conditions and circumstances. The challenge ofdealing with it is
that ofunderstanding its root causes and formulating appropriate, similarly dynamic and
adaptable strategies. Integral to this process is the identification ofthe protagonists as well
as the understanding oftheir role and their cause and effect relationship.
Economic differentials most certainly figure largely in the decisions of those who emigrate.
But there is little evidence to suggest that the a "mass exodus" scenario, in which millions of
poor, deprived people in the South will break through the immigration barriers ofthe North,
is upon us. Emigration pressure is, ofcourse, relative. There have always been and still are
millions ofpersons ready to move to countries with higher standards of living and fairer
political systems. Pressure is normally strongest in countries at the deprivation end of
economic/income development and ofthose ofpolitical freedom/human rights spectrum.
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The two circumstances are not unconnected. Pioneering work by Aristid Zolberg and his
colleagues on the causes ofrefugee and irregular migration show that different types of
social conflict give rise to different types ofrefugee flows and that the patterns ofconflict
are themselves intimately related to general economic and political conditions. (Zolberg,
Suhrke, and Aguayo, 1986: 151-169). They contend that in the developing world, where
more than 90 percent ofthe world's refugees live, regimes come and go (e.g. civilian or
military, democratic or authoritarian) whereas the conflicts that produce this instability are
themselves enduring.
Unfortunately, most theoretical work to date has sought to explain potential rather than
actual migratory flows. But reality continues to demonstrate that a considerable distance
lies between the potential act and its realization, which is mediated by national and
transnational political structures. Rather than predicting a propensity for the masses to move
for economic improvement, one might even posit the opposite; that people suffering from
severe poverty are generally more likely to stay where they are until near starvation or other
catastrophic conditions overtake them. It is only then that they try to move elsewhere, most
often, as is the case in Africa, to a nearby country which is not much better off than their
own. Distance, inability to finance travel and a fear ofthe unknown combine to prevent
people (specially the poor) from becoming part ofa mass exodus, so feared by the more
developed countries. Such people rarely pose a significant migrant threat to the countries of
the North (Appleyard, 1991: 3). Indeed the most significant population movements, mainly
refugee migration, the type closely associated with socio-economic deprivation, limited
political freedom and social conflict, has occurred mainly between countries ofthe South.
A greater threat to the countries ofthe North is expected to come from those compatriots of
the refugees who are in better social, educational and economic circumstances or from
persons in countries higher up the international per capita GDP ladders, who are ambitious,
know when and where the opportunities exist, can raise the travel costs and, if necessary,
will risk arrest in a country ofthe North, knowing that their deportation is unlikely. Persons
with these characteristics appear to typify the increasing asylum-seeker and illegal
population in countries ofthe north (Appleyard, 1991: 3).
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The social, political, economical, natural and environmental events and disasters ofthe last
few decades have produced an unprecedented number and variety of international migrants.
The most significant ofwhich are the refugees. Approximately 90 percent ofthe world's
refugees are from developing countries and over 90 percent ofthem will remain in
developing countries (Stein, 1986: 265).
In recent years there have been much talk ofresolving the problems of migration,
particularly the Northward movements by the desperate masses, through creating more
favorable economic conditions in the countries oforigin. It is not surprising that many
influential scholars and administrators have concluded that in the absence of appropriate
global policies, particularly economic policies, differentials of present magnitude are
unlikely to narrow and migration pressure is likely to increase during the coming
decades. Jones N. Purcell, the Director General of the International Organization for
Migration (lOM), for example, has warned that ''when economic stagnation or a sharp
fall in income further aggravates the deprivation of vast numbers of less-privileged
people in the South, generating a feeling of despair and hopelessness, then mass
migration, legal or illegal, could occur" (Purcell 1991).
Ifmigration movement is created or accelerated because ofthe economic differentials
between North and South, which motivates overcoming obstacles in order to increase
financial and social gains, then the solution seems to be clear. Reduce the differentials and
you have removed the pull and push factors, which results in the flow. A substantial amount
of international aid directed toward development projects in the third world has been
motivated by this "solution". However, the idea of solving the "global refugee crisis" by
stepping up development aid, in order to modify socio-economic conditions in the countries
oforigin, reduces the root causes ofthe problem to a simple set ofeconomic factors.
On the other hand, developing comprehensive international co-operations, has the merit that
it recognizes that the problem of migration is secondary to that of development. Long
term control ofpopulation movement can be made possible only through policies that
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address the needs ofthe populations ofthe countries ofthe South for their very survival as
well as their aspirations for economic mobility. These strategies need to address the issues of
trade, debt relief, investment and co-operative aid, in addition to those of stability,
democracy, freedom and respect for human rights.
Development strategies that effectively address North-South differentials, however, will
• '- :1•. ~__~n~;l" A",,,j,,pA The, SU)uth. like the north. encompasses a myriad of
residence while three were planning and hoping for immigration to the west (two to
Canada and one to New Zealand).
When asked whether they would still have come to South Africa if they knew what they
know now about the conditions oflife in the country, only 4 said they still would have
come. Six believed that if they knew the true state of affairs in the country, they would
not have come here, but would have tried another country.
The main problems facing the refugees, according to both the interviewees and the
participants in the focus group, were: lack of useful IDs and other documents,
accommodation, difficulties in finding jobs, school fees for the children, lack of legal aid
and representation and xenophobia. These are, of course, particular problems of the
refugee communities. These are additions to the more universal problems of crime,
violence and unemployment that confront everyone else. .
Lack of proper documents such as valid ID card and/or travel document, was by far the
most serious problem faced by all of the refugees. This particular problem seems to
hamper them in different ways from opening a bank account to applying for certain jobs
or trainings. This is one area where all agreed that the government should take action and
provide the refugees with these documents.
Another recommendation forwarded by two of the interviewees was that government
should inform both the public and private sectors of the rights and privileges of the
An added dimension ofthe present refugee problem is that a much higher percentage ofthe
refugee population is made up of people who remain refugees for much longer periods than
ever before. This failure to resolve the refugee situation has been characterized as "crisis in
durable solution" which has been an item in the agenda ofUNHCR's Executive Committee
since 1983 (Stein, 1986: 277). Commitment to "durable solution" therefore, means
expanding the notion ofrefugee protection from short term to medium and long term.
There are only 3 durable solutions; a) voluntary repatriation; b) temporary local settlement
or integration; and c) the third country resettlement. As refugee situations are often caused
by government action, durable solutions also depend ofthe same. In other words, refugee
problems are political and therefore, their solutions must be political. Thus, as there are
many obstacles in the path of implementation ofthese solutions, strong political will and
capacity is required for achievement ofany ofthem (Stein, 1986: 267).
Voluntary repatriation is the most sought after solution. Refugees run away from their
homes because the "basic bond between citizens and government has been broken, fear has
replaced trust, the father or motherland is persecuting and rejecting some of its own..."
(Stein, 1986: 269). Voluntary repatriation could only occur successfully after a change in the
situation such as: achieving independence; a change ofregime; an end to the conflict; etc.
People often flee for a confused combination of reasons that mixes political persecution
and insecurity with social and economic disruptions. "Some who have nothing to fear of
personally are caught up in the panicky exodus or join it because ofvague expectations of
adventure and opportunity. [However,] as the situation stabilizes, the worst fears fade;
the expectations wither and many of the refugees wonder why they ever left home"
(Stein, 1986,271). It is only then that organized and well-orchestrated repatriation plans
will be most effective. The international experience of repatriation programs so far,
however, has not been marked by much success. Much more careful planning and
organization is needed for future plans.
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Table 3: Major voluntary repatriations during 1997 and 1998
Country of asylum 1997 1998 Total
Burundi - 3600 3,600
Central African Rep. 1,800 - 1,800
Tanzania 24,400 52,700 77,100
Uganda 14,100 9,500 23,600
Zambia 4,800 200 5,000
Total 45,100 66,000 111,100
Source: 1998 Statistical Overview, UNHCR, p. 28
As table 3 demonstrates the past few years have witnessed a significant movement of
Congolese refugees from various countries back to DRC. As far as the Zairian community
in Durban is concerned however, no statistics ofreturned refugees are available. As for the
study group, 8 out of 10 interviewees indicated their willingness to return to Zaire, but this /
was conditional upon a complete change in and improvement ofthe social, political and .
economic conditions. Unfortunately, as the conflict and instability that led them to leave
their native land is still very much present, voluntary repatriation in the near future does not
seem to be an option for them.
Temporary local settlement or integration is the least favored of durable solutions. The
declaration of the Second International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa
(ICARA IT), held in July 1994, notes: "Where voluntary return is not immediately
feasible or possible, conditions should be created within the country of asylum for a
temporary settlement or the integration of refugees in the community and their full
participation in its social and economic life" (cited in Stein, 1996:273).
The temporary settlement or integration ofthe refugees is not favored by majority ofthe
host countries. The reasons for rejection ofthis option include a complex mix ofactual and
predicted factors. These include: the size ofrefugee population might be too large for the
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host country to absorb; the fear that local settlement will attract or encourage further flow of
refugees; unwillingness or inability ofthe host country to financially commit to such
programs; the fear ofbeing accused ofgiving priority to refugees over their own needy
nationals and to bring refugees into economic competition with their nationals; the fear that
refugee concerns may skew their national development plans and priorities; the concerns
about clash ofcultures between the refugees and the nationals and the inability or
unwillingness of the refugees to integrate; and the fear that support for refugees political
cause would be weakened if they were integrated and ceased to be visible, for instance in the
case ofPalestinians in the Middle East or Mghanis in Pakistan (Stein, 1986 :274).
South Africa's new Refugee Act (1998) which provides for the granting ofall the rights of
the citizens to the asylum seekers who are recognized as such, has come a long way from
the traditional treatment ofrefugees as prohibited or undesirable persons. Refusal ofthe
government to establish refugee camps and the granting ofpermission to work or to study,
even to some ofthe prohibited persons, are also positive steps in the direction of integration.
There is, however, a great need for formation ofplans and initiation ofprojects that takes the
integration further than intentions and into the realm of practice. The first steps in this path
would be the dissemination ofcorrect information, both to the refugees about their rights
and responsibilities, and to the public about refugees. Combating xenophobia and creating
an atmosphere ofmutual cooperation, especially in development and economic activities,
are long term elements ofany successful attempt at integration.
The third country settlement historically has been used only for a small percentage of
refugees. After the Second World War many ofthe refugees and the displaced people were
resettled in countries such as United States, Canada and Australia. Since then, however, the
absorptive power ofthe host countries has been depleted. Compassion fatigue, xenophobia,
economic problems and difficulties in integrating large numbers ofvarious ethnic and
cultural backgrounds have resulted in this option becoming the least realistic and durable
solution.
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Since 1996 there has been only two relatively small and insignificant cases of
resettlement movement for the Zairian refugees. The combined result of these two cases
has settled 290 Zairians in a third country. Kenya as one of these countries has received
150 Zairians while Zambia has settled another 140 (UNHC~ 1998: 31).
Ofthese durable solutions those of voluntary repatriation and the third country resettlementdo not seems to be in sight or feasible for most ofthe refugees living in South Africa. The
remaining option, the temporary local settlement or integration should be carefully re-
examined. In doing so it becomes clear that there are three potential strategies needed for
South Africa to deal with the refugee influx. The first is to gain a deeper understanding of
the social and economic potential of the refugees. How could they best contribute to the
ongoing or anticipated development plans and programs ofthe government? Where could
they best serve, considering their skills and experiences? How could they be integrated intothe formal economy? How could they be encouraged and assisted in taking constructive rolein the informal economy? How to distinguish and integrate different categories of
immigrants to the mutual benefit for them and the country?
The second strategy is that ofreversing the unfounded fears and xenophobic tendencies
which lead to tension, animosity and discrimination. How to inform the public ofthe
positive and constructive effect ofrefugees in social and economic well being of the
country? One line of action, along with the training of the Home Affairs officers, is the
dissemination of information about various categories of immigrants and their rights and
privileges to all the potential employers either in public or private sector. As noted by allthose interviewed, very few people bother to read the text of their permit in which the
permission to seek employment and study is given. It is logical to assume that the
majority of people in position of providing employment, still carry the historical
connotations associated with the term "prohibited" person and are therefore ignorant ofits recent application. That is why they are easily influenced by the collective demands ofthe local employees to retrench the "foreigners" or to refrain from hiring them.
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Provision for training of the refugees in the local language might be an important key to
integration of the refugees in the community. Many of the western countries have
language classes and cultural events organized for the refugees to familiarize them with
the language and the culture of their adopted homes. This could be a useful lesson for
integration of the refugees in South African community, particularly where there is
resentment due to their lack of knowledge of the local language. In the case ofZairian
refugees, as well as all the other refugees from non English-speaking countries, there is
the added complication oflearning English as well as the local language. None ofthose
interviewed had any formal English language training (except for the lessons they had
received in their secondary education). Only one had a few months of evening classes
offered by a volunteer.
The third strategy is for South Africa to take a leading role in the regional migration
control. Revolution, civil turmoil, ethnic conflict and other causes of flight could not be
resolved easily, quickly or in isolation. These conflicts are never purely internal but
rather transnational in nature and as they continue and develop they tend to become
further internationalized (Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo, 1986: 167). Therefore, they have
to be understood and addressed at regional, if not global, context.
Since 1993 when South Africa joined the Southern African Development Community
(SADC), it has been taking a leading role in establishing regional policy and standards.
The year 1996 was an important year in the history of refugee legislation in the region. In
that year, a Memorandum ofUnderstanding was signed between SADC and UNHCR,
which put refugee issues on the agenda and higWighted an agreement that collaborative,
regional efforts be taken to address refugee security and rights issues. Since then,
ironically, despite its domestic policy which discourages foreigners, it has displayed
special interest and energy towards creation of a regional refugee policy (Sinclaire,
1996). This current enthusiasm is due firstly to South Africa's distance from the
continent's trouble spots and the fact that there is little chance of it ever being swamped
by masses of refugees from those areas as attested by the Rwandan case. Many ofthe
other African states including some ofthe other SADC countries such as Zambia,
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Tanzania, and Zaire have much higher refugee populations that is much more likely to
increase rather than decrease in future












Source: UNHCR, 1998 Statistical Overview, p. 8
Source"" UNHCR, Accumulative numbers ofrefugees in South Africa, 1999
Secondly, there is little to be lost and much to be gained by South Africa in engaging in
international humanitarian treaties on refugees. First, South Africa is trying to achieve
international standing and welcome from the international community. The success ofthe
political and economic agenda ofthe government depends closely on international
recognition ofthe new government's human rights records. Second, South Africa is actively
wooing foreign investment and trade with various regions and countries around the globe.
Evidence ofmoral standing in human right issues is valuable in this process. Another
positive aspect is that South Africa is seeking a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.
For this to be even considered, it needs to show willingness to accede to international
treaties ofvarious kinds and to display high regard for human rights issues both
domestically and in the regional arena.
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South Mrica has placed itself in a leading position within SADC. By using this structure, it
can begin to countenance a regional strategy on prevention offuture flows, so protecting
itself from the future possibility oflarge inflow ofrefugees (Sinclaire, 1996:7). A generous
refugee policy counters the xenophobic image ofthe country, which has hinted at presently
increasingly close door policy toward the rest ofAfrica. And finally, by adopting a friendlier
policy, South Africa is able to utilize the resources ofUN in the event of repatriation
(Sinclaire, 1996: 13)
Considering the advantages ofpursuing a regionally leading role in migration control, South
Africa seems to be in the desirable position to contribute to finding durable solution for the
refugee problem within the region. The full integration ofthe refugees, more equal treatment
ofthe asylum seekers and migrant workers, more humane treatment ofundocumented
migrants, more meaningful collaboration and assistance in regional development plans, etc,
all have reciprocal benefits for the new South Africa in this transitional phase of its
development. These are advantages and benefits that could not be easily ignored.
As the world shrinks ever closer to a global village, mankind is pushed into its citizenry.
There is no room left for waste ofany resources and capacities be they natural, economic or,
most precious ofall, human. If the finite resources of the planet are to be used to the mutual
benefit ofall its inhabitants, the logical first step is securing the well being of its human
resources. It is no longer possible for the vast majority ofthe populations ofthe world to be
excluded because ofthe undue considerations to ethnicity, race, gender, religion, and place
ofbirth or nationality. The sooner that the genuine spirit ofcollaboration, inclusion and
reciprocity permeate the regional, transnational and international relations, the faster would
be the discovery of innovative and satisfactory solution to the planets contemporary
problems such as those ofpopulation movements
82
BIBLIOGRAPHY
R. Appleyard (1991), "International Migration: Challenge for the Nineties", Published
For the 40th Anniversary ofInternational Organization for Migration (laM)
R. Appleyard (1991a), "Migration and Development: a critical relationship", Asian and
Pacific Migration Journal, vol.l, no. I.
A. Bouillon (1999), ''Migrants africains"continentaux"etjrancophones en Ajrique du Sud:
Un apercu d 'ensemble", in Antoine Bouillon (00), Immigration africaine en Ajrique du Sud:
Les migrantsjrancophones des annees 90, Edition Karthala et IFAS
M. Blanchfield, (1997), "From Apartheid to Xenophobia", The Ottawa Citizen 7 May
1997
P. Bourdieu (1986), "The forms ofcapital, in John G. Richardson (ed), Handbook ofTheory
andResearchfor the Sociology ofEducation", Greenwood Press, New York: 241-58.
P. Bourdieu and L Wacquant (1992), ''An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology", University of
Chicago Press, Chicago
M. Buthelezi, (Minister ofHome Affairs) (1994), "Introductory Speech, Budgetary
Appropriation" in National Assembly, 9 August, 1994
S. Castle, and M.J. Miller (1993), "The Age ofMigration: International Population
Movements in the Modern World", Guilford Press, New York.
H. M. Choldin (1973), "Kinship Networks in the Migration Process", International
Migration Review, 7: 163-76
CIA, (1999), ''The World Factbook: Congo, Democratic Republic of',
http://www.odci.gov/cia/publicationlfactbook/cg.html
J. Coleman (1990), "Foundations ofSocial Theory", Harvard University Press, Cambridge,Mass.
J. Crush, (1997a), "Exaggerated Figures Are Creating a Xenophobic Atmosphere",
Business Day, June 30, 1997
J. Crush, (1997b), "Counter Operation: Clandestine Migration, Temporary Work and
Immigration Policy in South Ajrica", Cape Town: Migration Policy Series No. 1,
Southern African Migration Project,
J. Crush, (1998), "Immigration, Human Rights and the Constitution", in Jonathan Crush
(00), Beyond Control: Immigration andHuman Rights in a Democratic South Africa,
Southern African Migration Project, Cape Town, 1- 15
83
L. de la Hunt, (1998), "Refugees & Immigration Law in South Africa", in Ionathan Crush
(Bd), Beyond Control: Immigration andHuman Rights in a Democratic South Africa,
Southern African Migration Project, Cape Town, 123-149
F. De Vletter, (1998), "Sons ofMozambique: Mozambican Miners And Post-Apartheid
South Africa", Cape Town: Migration Policy Series No. 8, Southern African Migration
Project,
S. Duncan, (1998), "Bad Law: Applying The Aliens Control Act", in Ionathan Crush (ed),
Beyond Control: Immigration andHuman Rights in a Democratic South Africa, Southern
African Migration Project, Cape Town, 149-160
E.I.u., (1996), "Country Profile: Zaire, 1995-1996", The Economist Intelligence Unit
Limited, United Kingdom
L.J. Emmerij (1991), "The international situation, economic development and
employment", in a paper presented to the OSCD International Conference on Migration,
Rome, March 1991, p.6.
Human Rights Watch, "Prohibited Persons: Abuse of UndocumentedMigrants, Asylum
Seekers and Refugees in South Africa", New York, Human Rights Watch: 1998
V. Iohnson, J. Hill and E. Ivan-Smith, (no date given), "Listening to smaller voices:
Children in an environment ofchange", ACTIONAID
D. Kadima, (1999), ''Motivation a I 'emigration et activites economiques des immigres
congolais (RDC) en Afrique du Sud', in Antoine Bouillon (ed), Immigration qfricaine en
Afrique du Sud: Les migrantsfrancophones des annees 90, Edition Karthala et IFAS
D. Kadima, and G. Kalombo, (1995), "The Motivationsfor Emigration andproblems of
Integration ofthe Zairian Community in South Africa", Unpublished paper
M. Levy and W. Wadycki (1973), "The influence offamily andfriends on geographic /abormobility: an intercensal comparison", Review ofEconomics and Statistics, 55: 198-203
F. Lund (1998), "Women street traders in urban South Africa: A synthesis ofselected
research findings", CSDS Research Report No 15, School ofDevelopment Studies,
Centre For Social & Development Studies, University ofNatal Durban
D. McDonald, (1998), "Left Out in the Cold? Housing and Immigration in the New South
Africa". Cape Town: Migration Policy Series No. 5, Southern African Migration Project
D. McDonald, L. Mashike, and C. Golden, (1999), "The Lives and Times ofAfrican
Migrants and Immigrants in Post-Apartheid South Africa", Cape Town: Migration Policy
Series No. 13, Southern African Migration Project
84
1. S. MacDonald and L.D. MacDonald, (1974), "Chain migration, ethnic neighbourhood
formation, and social networks", in Charles Tilly (00), An Urban World, Little, Brown &
Co., Boston: P 226-36
L. Madywabe, (1997), "Maligned migrants create jobs", Crossings, Vol. 1. No.1,
September 1997, published by South African Migration Project
C. Manning and AP. Mashigo, (1994), ''Manufacturing in South African Micro-
enterprises", in illS Bulletin Vol. 25, No. 1 January 1994,30-36
C. Manning and AP. Mashigo, (1993), "Manufacturing in South African Microenterprises
in South Africa" , Research Report to the Industrial Strategy Project, Cape Town, UCT
D. Massey, (1987), "UnderstandingMexican migration to the United States", American
Journal of Sociology, 92: 1372-1403
D. Massey, and F.S. Espafia, (1987), "The socialprocess ofinternational migration",
Journal of Social Science, 237: 733-738.
Vb. Massey, J Aragno, G. Hugo, A Kouaouci, A Pellegrino, 1. E. Taylor, (1998), "Words In
Motion: Understanding International Migration at the End ofthe Millennium", Clarendon
Press, Oxford
A Minaar and M. Hough, (1996), ''Who goes there?: Perspectives on clandestine migration
and illegal aliens in southern Africa", HSRC Publishers, Pretoria
S. Peberdy, and 1. Crush, (1998), "Rooted in Racism: The Origins ofthe Aliens Control
Act", in Jonathan Crush (00), Beyond Control: Immigration andHuman Rights in a
Democratic South Africa, Southern African Migration Project, Cape Town, 18-37
1.N. Purcell, Opening Address, International Migration, vol. xxix, no.2, June 1991, p.158.
C. M. Rogerson and M. de Silva (1988), "Upgrading urban small-scaleforms of
production: the South African case", in G. j. R. Linge (00), Peripherialization and
industrial Change, pp. 199-213, Beckenham: Croom Helm
C. M. Rogerson (1992), "The absorptive capacity ofthe informal sector in the South
African city" in D. Smith (ed) The Apartheid City and Beyond: Urbanisation and Social
Change in South Africa, Routledge, London and New York and Wits University Press
C. M. Rogerson, (1997), "International Migration, Immigrant Entrepreneurs and South
Africa's Small Enterprise Economy", Cape Town: Migration Policy Series No. 3,
Southern African Migration Project,
85
P. Schaefer (1993). "A definition ofmigration pressure based on demand theory ", Journal
ofIntemational Migration, 31 :43-72
Sechaba Consultants, (1997), "Riding the Tiger: Lesotho Miners and Permanent
Residence in South Africa Cape Town ", Migration Policy Series No. 2, Southern African
Migration Project
M. R Sinclair, (1996), "Migration Research in South Africa: Current Trends and New
Directions", Southern African Perspective, No. 60, Centre for Southern African Studies,
School ofGovernment, University ofWestern Cape
M. R Sinclair (1998), "International refugee treaties and their implicationsfor South
African State ", Southern African Perspective, No. 69, Centre for Southern African Studies,
School ofGovernment, University ofWestern Cape
RN. Stein (1986), "Durable Solutionsfor Developing Country Refugees ", International
Migration Review, vol. 20, No. 2, p. 265-278
T. Straubhaar (1993). ''Migration Pressure ", International Migration, 31: 5-42.
1. E. Taylor, (1986), "Differential migration, networks, information and risk", in O. Stark
(ed), Migration Theory, Human Capital andDevelopment, JA! Press, Greenwich, Conn:
147-71
1. E. Taylor, (1987), "UndocumentedMexico-US migration and the return to household in
ruralMexico", American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 69:626-38
UNDP, (1999), "Human Development Report 1998", published for the United Nation
Development Program (UNDP), New York, Oxford, Oxford University Press
World Bank ,(1999), "WorldDevelopment Report, 1998/1999 ", Published for the world
Bank, New York, Oxford, Oxford University Press
UNHCR, (1999), ''Refugees And Others ofConcern To UNHCR: 1998 Statistical
Overview ", United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva,
D. Yaukey, (1978), "Demography: The Study ofHuman Population" , Pennsylvania StateUniversity
W. Ze1insky, (1971), "The hypothesis ofmobility transition", Geographical Review, No.61: 219-249
A. R Zolberg, A. Suhrke, and S. Aguayo, (1989), "Escape from violence.
Conflict and the refugee crisis in the developing world", Oxford University Press, NewYork.
86
A. R. Zolberg, A. Suhrke, and S. Aguayo, (1986), ''Factors information ofRefugee
Movements", International Migration Review, vo!. 20, No. 2, P 151-169
Legal Documents and Government Gazettes:
Draft Green Paper on International Migration, presented to the Minister ofHome Affairs
on May 13, 1997
http:/wwwpolity.org.za/govdocs/green-'papers/imigration/migrate.html
Republic of South Africa, (1996), "Constitution ofthe Republic ofSouth Africa",
Pretoria, Republic of South Africa
Republic of South Africa, (1998), "Refugee ACT", Cape Town, Republic of South Africa
Republic of South Africa, (1996), "Aliens Control Amendment ACT (A CTNo. 78 of
1995)", Pretoria, Republic of South Africa
Republic of South Africa (1991), "Aliens Control Act", Pretoria, Republic of South
Africa
UNHCR, (1991), "Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers". Geneva,
UNHCR, (1995), "1951 Convention And 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees. 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects ofRefugee Problems in
Africa", UNHCR Regional Office for Southern Africa
87
Appendix 1: Questionnaire for the individual interviews
Questionnaire
Describe the conditions ofyour family in the country of origin?
- Age:
- Place ofbirth:
- Place of residence in Zaire:
- Number of siblings: Brothers Sisters
- Education: Primary Secondary Tertiary
- Marital status Single Married, have left wife and children back
in Zaire, Have a South African wife, divorced, widowed




How many people lived in your home?
General level of satisfaction with life (in scale of one to ten one being very
dissatisfied and ten being very satisfied)
Who do you live with in South Africa?
How did they come to South Africa?
When you left Zaire, were you alone or did you travel with anyone?
How many members ofyour family are living with you in SA?
What type ofvisa do you have?







banks and credit services
welfare services such as pensions
- Why did you decide to come to South Africa?
- How much did you know about the conditions oflife in South Africa?
- What was your source of information?
- What did you think would be the condition of life for foreigners living in South Africa?
- Had anyone in your family or among your friends immigrated internationally before? Ifyes:
How many?
- Who was the closest to you?
- Where did they migrate to?
- When?
- Were they happy/ successful in their adopted country?
- How do you know this?
- Did they have problems settling in their new country?
If yes: What kind of problems did they experience?
- How long did they stay there? (Are they still there?)
- Did they send any money back home? (How much? How often?)
- Did they encourage you or others to immigrate?
- Did they invite you or others to join them?
- Did you know anyone in South Africa before arriving here? Yes No
Ifyes, Who?
How?
- Did they encourage you to come to South Africa? Yes No
Ifyes, How?
Why?




- Did you have any contact address (es) upon arrival? Yes No
Ifno: How did you find a place to stay?
If yes: - Who was it?
How did you get that contact?
- Have your sponsor or contact asked you for anything in return for their assistance?
Yes No
IfYes: what?
- Did you receive any assistance from any organization? Yes No
If yes :
- What was the name of the organization?
- How did you get to know about them?
- What did they do to help you?
- Did you have to do anything in return for their assistance? Yes No
- What is your current relationship with them?
- Do you know anything about the Refugee Forum? Yes No
- Are you a member of any immigrant/refugee group? Yes No





-Have you assisted any other Zairian in South Africa? How?
- Are you familiar with the constitution of South Africa? Yes No
- Are you familiar with any ofthe laws of South Africa regarding immigration, asylum
seeking or refugee status? Yes No
- Are you familiar with the rights and responsibilities of immigrants, migrant workers,
asylum seekers, refugees, and illegals that live in South Africa?
Yes No
Do you think that the South African immigration laws are fair? Yes No
Why?
Do you think that South African government should make it easier for people in troubled
countries to immigrate here?
When did you leave your country?
Where was your immediate destination?
How did you travel?
When did you arrive in South Africa?
Ifthere was a lapse describe where you were and what you did)
When did you reach Durban?
Why did you choose Durban?
How did you reach Durban? (Describe how you traveled in South Africa)
How much money did you bring with you when you left your country?
How soon upon arrival did you start your first job in South Africa?
How soon upon arrival did you start your first job in Durban?
What was your first job in Durban?
Did anyone help you find your first job?
Ifyes: Explain who and how?
Yes No
Ifno: How did you find the job?
Have you helped other Zairian immigrants to get a job? How
How much did your first job pay?
How many hours of day did your job take?
How was your relationship with your employer and/or other workers?
Did you make friends with those you worked for or with?
What is your present job?
How many hours a day do you work now?
How much do you get paid at your present job?
Do you receive any benefits such as health insurance, etc?
Ifyou were doing the same work back in your country of origin how much would it have
paid?
Would you have taken a job like that in your own country?
Is it difficult to find a job in your country?
Is it difficult to find a job in South Africa?
In which one of these countries it is easier to get ajob?
How is your relationship with your employer and/or other workers?
Have you made friends with those you are working for or with now?
Do you have any South African friends?
Are you happy with the way that South Africans treat you? Yes No
Explain:
How many jobs have you had since you have come to Durban? Why?
How satisfied are you with your present job? (On scale of one to ten)
What kind ofwork do you like to do?
What would you need to find a suitable job?
Is there anything that you think government should do to help migrants find jobs?
yes No
What?
Do you have any problems communicating with your employer or other employees?
How long did it take you to learn English?
Who helped you to learn English?
How did you find your first accommodation?
How was your relationship to your neighbors?
Were there any other Zairians in the area?
What is your present accommodation like?
Are you satisfied with your present accommodation? Yes No
If no, What is the problem?
Is there anything that you think the government should do to help migrants find
accommodation? Yes No
What?
Are there any social benefits or services that you think migrants should be receiving?
What are the main problems of migrants living in South Africa?
How long do you plan to stay in South Africa?
Ifyou had the knowledge of life in South Africa that you have now when you were stillliving in Zaire, would you still have made the move?
How do you rate your quality of life in South Africa (on the scale of one to ten, one beingvery dissatisfied to ten being very satisfied)
Thank you very much for your time.
Appendix 2: Questions for the focus group
Questions for the group interview
• Did you know anyone who emigrated to another country before you left Zaire?
• Did you know anyone in South Africa before you arrived here?
• Did you have a contact address in South Africa?
• Why did you choose South Africa?
• How did you arrive in South Africa?
• Did anyone encourage you to come to South Africa?
• Did you receive assistance from any individual or organization? What?
• What was the first thing you did upon arrival?
• Have you made any friends among South Africans?
• Do you have any communication problems?
• Do you think: it is necessary to learn Zulu? Why?
• What are the major problems ofZairian refugees in South Africa?
• Do you think that the government of South Africa should make it easier for refugeesto come here? What?
• What can government do to help refugees with jobs?
• What can government do to help refugees with accommodation?
• Would you like to become a citizen of South Africa?
• How long would you like to stay in South Africa?
Appendix 3: Questions for Representative of the Refugee Reception
Center
Questions
1- The statistics of the Zairians in South Africa in general and in Durban in particular
since 1990 (in all categories including temporary permit to the prohibited person,
asylum seekers, refugees, immigrants, illegals, etc).
2- What kind ofvisa is commonly issued to the Congolese nationals who arrive in
Durban? Why?
3- What are the advantages and disadvantages of this visa?
4- What are the differences between a temporary permit to the prohibited person and a
refugee visa?
5- When does the new Refugee Act, which was passed on December 1998, come to
effect?
6- How would the new regulations effect the holders of the temporary permit to the
prohibited person?
7- Is it possible for those who currently hold the temporary permit to change their visa to
that ofasylum seekers or refugees? How?
Appendix 4: Provisions of 1913 Immigration Regulation Act
• A Department ofImmigration that was later called the Department of Interior and
much later, Home Affairs. The formation of an entire government department to
control immigration issues reflects the importance placed by the government on
immigration issues.
• Criteriafor Entry: those who met the criteria became permanent residents and those
who did not were called "prohibited immigrants". These included anyone likely to
become a charge of the state, anyone who was:
1. Undesirable for political (racial) reasons
2. A prostitute or living off the earning of one
3. Had a criminal record
4. Mentally or physically disabled without security for permanent support
5. Carried a contagious or "loathsome" disease
The immigration officer at the port of entry made the pronouncement for an
individual or for a "class of persons"
• An Immigration Board, the purpose ofwhich was to hear appeals by people who had
been declared "prohibited immigrants".
• Appeal against prohibition that had to be filed within three days of notification of
being declared a prohibited immigrant. There were no requirements as to hearing oral
evidence of the applicant and no right of appeal against the decision in any court of
law. The burden of proof also rested on the applicant and not the state.
• Power ofdetention of the prohibited immigrant and those suspected ofbeing
prohibited immigrants by police and immigration officers. They could be arrested or
detained without a warrant of arrest and the officers having the right to remove
(deport) the prohibited immigrants under warrant.
• Exemption to the act giving the minister discretion to allow the entry to certain
groups of people who might otherwise be declared prohibited immigrants such as
migrant laborers. This was particularly to safeguard the interests of the mining
industry and the white farmers who needed the migrant laborers.
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